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Abstract 
New millennium brought few changes in macro economical situation in the world, and 
especially in oil and gas industry. In the beginning of 2000s global business cycle was 
changed. Since 2002 world oil prices have more than tripled, global growth has average 
meaning above the trend. Labor shedding, low and falling inflation, low rates on capital 
markets were inherent to early phase of economy recovery (NPC report, 2007). Dot-com 
bubble (2001), Subprime mortgage crisis (2008) and other challenges in global economy 
attracted attention of researchers and force them to look on capital structure choices with 
respect to new economical conditions. 
In current paper we consider factors influence on debt ratio choice, being more precisely, we 
are going to estimate to what extant does set factors influence on debt ratio choice. The study 
provides answer on question what factors are more suitable for explanation of debt ratio 
choice and how to calculate the strength of factors influence. The research goal is making a 
specific investigation that will be essential for chosen population.  
The study has a qualitative nature. Therefore, secondary data is the most reliable. Set of 
econometric tools are used. The oil and gas industry of European region is taken as an object. 
The investigation covers 13 years. We determined few assumptions with respect to benefits 
and costs of debt and based on them stated hypotheses. Solving research questions provide 
answer on question how firm’s size, tangible asset, operational income, amount of cash, taxes, 
and intangible asset influence debt ratio.  
Keywords: capital structure, Modigliani-Miller theorem, optimal financial mix, optimal debt 
ratio choice, trade-off theory, pecking order theory, agency problem.   
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1. Introduction 
Following section gives the understanding of authentic motives and intentions of 
investigation. It helps the reader to be in touch with the last changes in business 
environmental and how these changes are influencing capital structure choice. We explain 
what reason lies behind our choice and how it will be useful for business community in future.   
Main problem determined with necessary limitations. It is obviously, the reader who does not 
familiar with the theme of the work finds it hard to understand problem stated. Therefore we 
formulated few research questions that provide support in solving it and look deeply into 
causes of investigation. The reader becomes aware of theoretical methods and software tools 
that are used in the course of research. At the end of the current section we give a short 
description of each element of this paper.  
1.1. Background of the research 
In a modern world where access to debt capital is becoming easier rapidly companies’ managers 
have to make an important choice whether to accept this attractive debt offer or not. Borrowed 
money helps start business quicker and have less limits on resources needed for a start-up. 
However, can a company being 100% debt-financed be stable and long-lasting? This is probably 
one of the questions that managers are asking when making the capital structure choice. 
Present study rises from the project paper called “Factors influencing capital structure 
choice”. It involved us in the world of corporate finance and gave an inspiration to make a 
deep investigation of financial mix choice. Making literature review we understood the real 
importance of reasonable debt choice and its influence on firm’s value. Classical theorem of 
Modigliani and Miler provides a good platform for research and directs our investigation from 
irrelevance of capital structure in perfect markets to imperfections of current capital markets.  
Wide number of factors gives a lot of opportunities for different kinds of capital structure 
investigation. Discussion of factors nature, correlation and factor analyses are only few of 
them. With respect to findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995) about a set of capital structure 
determinants proper for all development countries we admitted a national and industry 
specificity of factors. Empirical works of Gaud (2007), Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 
Frydenberg (2001) bring us to the idea of examining strength of dependence the debt ratio 
formation from determined equilibrium and non-equilibrium factors. Trade-off and pecking 
order theories support research with necessary static and dynamic models. Based on classical 
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theory, studies about capital markets imperfections, and empirical evidence we are going to 
continue our investigation and bring new experience in the study of capital structure 
formation.  
Second millennium brought new challenges in economic environment. One business cycles 
were replaced by others. From the beginning of 2000s global upturn was in its infancy and 
deflation. But oil and gas industry goes through new shock.  World oil prices have more than 
tripled since 2002. Low and falling inflation, weak recovery in economy and deflation forced 
banks to cup policy interest rates to emergency lows. At the same time income taxes and 
rebates were cut. This situation was transmitted through global capital markets very fast. Debt 
became cheaper and gave more opportunities for firms in oil and gas industry (NPC, 2007). 
Such economic transformations were a huge motive to take a look into the dependence of the 
debt ratio choice on equilibrium and non-equilibrium factors.  
It is a first attempt to make such investigation in oil and gas industry. We hope, business 
community will find the particular research field very interesting, because managers’ and 
shareholders’ desire to discover optimal financial mix will exist until commodity-money 
relations alive. Understanding the factors’ power of influence on firms’ capital structures is an 
important and urgent topic for every manager to be aware of. 
1.2. Problem statement 
In project paper we gave answer on question: Which factors should managers take into 
consideration when making the capital structure decision? There were determined few 
equilibrium and non-equilibrium factors. Under equilibrium factors we mean benefits (tax 
deductibility of interest and discipline of debt) and costs (bankruptcy, agency, loss of 
flexibility) of debt. Stages in the life cycle, types of assets are attributed to non-equilibrium 
factors. We explained under what conditions these factors appear and what impact does each 
of them have on the capital structure. The classical theorem of Modigliani and Miller 
proposed main assumptions of financial mix in perfect capital markets and was the base for 
further investigation. Imperfections of modern capital markets gave a chance to discover a 
wide set of factors influencing debt ratio choices. Should be noted that it is very important to 
be aware of reason why firm prefers one financial mix before another. It could be explained 
by shareholders’ desire to keep the flexibility of their mangers or get a higher amount of tax 
shield. Among hundreds of research papers there are three main theories that help to explain 
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this statement: the trade-off and the pecking order theories, the agency hypothesis. First two 
theories give a base for our investigation. Static and dynamic models that they use make 
possible to test a relationship between debt ratio and determined factors.  
For making a good decision it is not enough to know about correlation between two factors. It 
is necessary to measure this dependency. Each assumption should be proved by reliable 
evidence either theoretical or empirical. In our case, we provide theoretical base for study and 
now we need to prove it using qualitative model. It is time to emphasize what we want to 
prove making this research and determine problem statement: To what extant do factors 
affect debt ratio choices of firms in oil and gas industry? Which factors should be treated as the 
most influential ones?  
1.3. Research questions and restrictions 
As we mentioned above it is hard to understand stated problem if you do not familiar with 
present theme. This section provides better explanation of research problem for the reader. 
We formulate following research questions that help to solve main problem: 
− What factors are more suitable for explanation of debt ratio choices in oil and gas 
industry? 
− What computations do reflect all properties of factors in more suitable form?  
− Are theoretical models sufficient in creating qualitative model and reflecting 
dependency between debt ratio and variables? 
− How factors should be embedded in qualitative model? 
− What is the way to provide associate results for whole industry? 
− How do we compare the influencing power of each factor? 
In the next chapter we state hypotheses and further we are going to test them by using one of 
the qualitative methods. We hope these hypotheses help to answer research questions and 
make the reader more familiar with the study problem. It is obviously that qualitative 
methodology is a base of our investigation and so utilization of econometric software is 
inherent element of empirical and analytical chapters. As was mentioned above set of firms in 
oil and gas industry is an object of study. This choice explained by the oil shocks and changes 
of business global cycle in the beginning of 2000s. Hence, the investigation covers period of 
12 years from 2000 till 2012.  
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It is impossible to make a good research without any restrictions. The current paper work is 
not an exception therefore we provide the reader with main limitations. First of them 
associated with data collection and exploitation. Even though we are going to work just with 
secondary data, or more precisely, with financial statements it is necessary to turn data into 
required form. There are few differences between financial statements in different countries 
even in one region. It depends from accounting system that is used and from state policy in 
specific region. It is a time-consuming to get the same data when one statement are prepared 
with respect to international financial reporting standards (IFRS) and another one due to US 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Second limitation arises with process of 
factors computation and necessity to keep factor’s properties. Factors are being under 
influence of each other. So they can distort genuine effect on debt ratio. It is necessary to 
calculate variables in order to provide more reliable and stable input data. Usage of 
quantitative model creates another limitation. It is important to find significant relationships 
between variables and test so called goodness of fit statistics. Brooks (2008: 107) defines it as 
“availability to test how well the sample regression function fits the data”. Validity and 
reliability of results should be checked. It is worth to emphasis that restrictions inherent 
almost in all kinds of computations. Each manipulation with data also leads to limitations. So 
we need to be very attentive to these operations and check results twice, even though it is 
time-consuming. 
1.4. Structure of the master thesis 
The master thesis consists of the following parts: introduction, theoretical, 
methodological, empirical, analytical chapters and conclusions. 
Introduction presents the background of the research, motives and intentions, the 
object of research, the problem statement, research questions and main restrictions. 
Theoretical chapter gives the theoretical explanation of studied problem and research 
questions. Fist section defines capital structure choice, optimal financial mix, and debt ratio 
choice. Further Modigliani-Miller assumptions about perfect capital market are highlighted. 
Opposed to them imperfections of present capital markets are also described. Chapter 
provides a set of factors that have influence on debt ratio. Pecking order and trade-off theories 
are a base for next estimation. Few hypotheses stated with respect to assumptions of imperfect 
capital markets. 
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Methodological chapter provides the research plan, literature review. Explained steps 
of research design and discussed methodology of data collection and processing. The chapter 
highlights research quality through such concepts as validity and reliability. Limitation for 
software exploitation and data collection are given.   
Empirical chapter explains computations of variables and their implementation into 
model.  
Analytical chapter provides the interpretation of results.  
Conclusion highlights main findings, implications, and limitations of the study. 
Further opportunities for research are provided. 
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2. Theoretical chapter 
Current chapter provides readers with literature review about capital structure choice. It 
starts from defining optimal financial mix and its role in a firm’s value. Second section 
explains main assumption of classical theorem of Modigliani and Miller. In third section we 
describe capital structure in markets with imperfections. Factors influencing debt ratio choice 
are determined. The reader becomes familiar with tax benefits of debt (so called tax shield), 
bankruptcy cost, and agency problem. The paper discloses non-equilibrium effects on capital 
structure. When main factors determined we continue with trade-off and pecking order 
theories that give evidence how exactly firms choose debt ratio under influence of these 
factors. Finally, main assumptions based on discussed information are made and hypotheses 
are stated. 
2.1. Capital structure and firm’s value 
Capital structure refers to the financing mix of various kinds of debt, borrowed or issued, 
preferred stock, and common equity (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). Firms with a great deal of 
debt are said to be highly leveraged, whereas the 100% equity financed ones are named 
unlevered. The mix of debt and equity tries to give answers on two main questions: in which 
proportion should the firm use debt and equity, and what types of financing should it use 
(Damodaran 2001).  
One can notice that capital structure differs significantly among companies especially in 
various industries. The reason for this is the strong managers’ desire to find the “optimal 
capital structure – a proportion of debt to equity that can be expected to maximize a 
company’s market value” (Chew, 2001: 181). A quick view on the formula below allows to 
understand that for the shareholders’ wealth to be affected by the capital structure, the latter is 
supposed to have an impact on either the level of expected cash flows (E(CFt)) or the cost of 
capital (r) (Hickman et al., 1996). 
      V = ∑ ()(
)∞
          (1) 
where, V is a company’s value. 
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Financial managers seek for the capital structure that maximizes value by maximizing 
expected cash flows, by minimizing costs of capital, or both. 
Corporate finance literature gives examples of explored techniques, or better to say various 
ways, how to find optimal financial mix. Damodaran singles out five main approaches (2001: 
571): 
1) operating income approach: based on correlation between amount of debt and maximum 
probability of default; 
2) cost of capital approach: finds an optimal relationship between cost of capital and debt 
ratio, and chooses the debt ratio that minimizes the cost of capital; 
3) leverage and the return differential: leverage as an instrument of maximization the return 
differential between the returns made by equity investors and the cost of equity; 
4) adjusted present value approach: tries to maximize firm value according to tax benefits 
and expected bankruptcy costs; 
5) comparative analysis: based on behavior of comparable firms. 
Frequently, find an optimal financial mix means to estimate target debt ratio. Such 
comparison is explained by the managers’ disposition towards benefits of debt: tax benefits 
and added discipline created by borrowing.  Damodaran identifies optimal debt ratio as the 
mix at which firm value is maximized (2001: 620). Based on this assumption we will try to 
explain what impacts have influence on debt ratio formation. 
Practice shows, it is not enough just to determine an optimal debt ratio but important to move 
to this ratio from current levels. Not always undervalued firms use all their excess debt 
capacity or overvalued firms have willingness to pay down debt. The most common answers 
on question “Why not to use excess debt capacity” are: 
− maximizing firm value is not a main object of firm activity; 
− losing a flexibility; 
− future financing needs; 
− likelihood of bankruptcy. 
However, there are firms that move from current mix to optimal very instantly. Degree of 
confidence in the optimal leverage estimate, comparability of industry, possibility of a 
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takeover, and need for financial flexibility determine the decision to shift the debt ratio to the 
optimal either quickly or gradually (Damodaran, 2001). 
Non-optimal usage of debt immediately leads to higher financing costs, followed by rejection 
of some capital budgeting projects that could have increased the shareholders’ wealth with an 
optimal financing mix (Melicher, 2003). Therefore, it is hard to underestimate the importance 
of the capital structure choice because it may affect the company both ways, either damaging 
its performance and leading to bankruptcy, or increasing the value of the firm and leading to 
the effective use of equity and debt.  
For better understanding the process of a debt ratio determination it is necessary to make an 
investigation of critical factors influencing debt ratio decisions and forcing managers to leave 
debt ratio unchanged, change gradually or immediately. In this case, study of perfect and 
imperfect capital markets helps to identify the most important benefits and costs associated 
with the use of more debt.  
2.2. Capital structure in perfect capital markets 
To understand the patterns of the modern imperfect capital markets let us first turn to the 
classical theorem of Modigliani and Miller (MM) based on the assumption that capital 
markets are perfect. This approach showing the irrelevance of capital structure in a perfect 
market setting makes a foundation for our further analysis of the capital structure as we drop 
the perfect market conditions to reflect the reality better. However, before we have a look at 
the famous MM’s propositions, let us understand the concept of perfect markets. 
Perfect capital markets possess certain characteristics that are not applicable to the real world. 
The initial work by MM (1958) was based on three significant assumptions about the markets 
their firms operate in: 
1) Absence of taxes. 
2) Possibility to raise external financing from debt or equity, with no issuance costs. 
3) No costs associated with bankruptcy. 
What is more, perfect markets form an environment without agency costs meaning that 
managers act to maximize the shareholders’ wealth and shareholders do not expropriate this 
wealth with investment, financing, or dividend decisions. 
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Perfect capital markets are sometimes also called frictionless. “Friction” in this context refers 
to the loss of value of any kind that appears when market transaction occurs.  
Correspondingly, no losses of value appear when a cash or securities move from claimants to 
the firm in perfect capital markets (Hickman et al., 1996). 
In their first fundamental article MM announced and proved the proposition about the 
irrelevance of capital structure in perfect markets (1958). This revolutionary finding states 
that values of levered and unlevered firms tend to one other and finally become equal in the 
market without imperfections. MM’s argument comes from the analysis of the two companies 
identical in every aspect but financing mix and market value. The story goes as the equity 
holders of the higher-valued leveraged firm would like to sell their shares and use the income 
received plus homemade leverage equivalent to the debt mix of the leveraged firm to buy 
shares of the lower-valued unleveraged firm. This tendency continues until the moment when 
values of all the companies become equal. The equilibrium is established due to the fact that 
buying-selling transactions generate riskless profit. As a result, MM conclude that value of 
the firm is not affected by its capital structure because any equity/debt combination maintains 
the same current value of the firm. 
In his critical article Miller (1988) wrote with regards to the MM approach: “Looking back 
now, perhaps we should have put more emphasis on the other, upbeat side of the “nothing 
matters” coin: showing what doesn’t matter can also show, by implication, what does.” That 
is why MM’s view on capital structure is always taken into consideration but almost never 
applied to the real world. Their proposition 1 forms the basis for the further research of the 
modern markets where the firm’s capital structure actually matters a lot. Why it happens so, 
will be discussed in the next section. 
2.3. Capital structure in markets with imperfections 
No doubt that real world differs a lot from the perfect one constructed by MM. In modern 
capital markets all the perfect market restrictions fail to remain. Since a company starts 
dealing with debt financing in the imperfect today’s capital market numerous factors 
influencing its value arise. This section is mainly devoted to the discussion of costs and 
benefits connected to the use of debt and theories that companies base their capital structure 
decisions on. Apart from that, we end the section by introducing several so-called “non-
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equilibrium” effects on capital structure which are primarily company specific, not industry 
wide as permanent influences discussed before. 
2.3.1. Tax effects on capital structure 
The existence of corporate and personal income taxes changes MM’s proposition of capital 
structure irrelevancy. In fact, presence of corporate taxes gives an advantage to using debt 
(Philippatos and Sihler, 1991). Tax law causes the benefit of debt, so called tax shield from 
debt. Tax shield is the reduction in income taxes that results from taking an allowable 
deduction from taxable income. The amount of tax shield varies depending on the country’s 
particular tax law, the taxpayer’s overall tax rate and cash flows for the given tax year. EU 
countries have specific law, according to which repatriated foreign profits are basically 
exempted from corporate taxes. The same law includes such instrument as loss carry-forward 
when tax expenditures could be transferred to the future periods.  The loss carry-forward has a 
weak negative effect. It reduces the gain from tax savings by debt finance (Buettner et al., 
2009). In some countries there is a dual corporate income tax regime, e.g. in China.  
To compute tax benefits from debt one can either 1) calculate the present value of the tax 
savings from interest payments and then add the amount to the firm’s value, or 2) measure 
savings from the tax deductions as the difference between pre-tax and after-tax rate of 
borrowing (Damodaran, 2001). 
Computation of the present value is done under few following assumptions (Damodaran, 
2001): 
− debt is perpetual; 
− interest rate on debt is taken as an appropriate discount rate for this cash flows as far as 
it reflects the riskiness of debt; 
− expected tax rate for the firm is unchanged over time and there is enough taxable 
income each period to claim the interest tax deduction.  
Based on these assumptions we calculate the present value of tax shield as follows: 
  Present	value	of	tax	shield = Marginal	tax	rate ∗ Debt = T ∗ B       (2) 
By adding this value to the initial value of the unlevered firm we see the effect that debt has 
on the latter. It can be presented by the formula: 
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   V'()((*	+,- = V./0()((*	+,- + T ∗ B        (3) 
The addition of the tax benefit from debt to the value of the firm with no debt shows clearly 
the advantages that debt provides to the levered company.  
Cooper and Nyborg (2006) make a reasonable suggestion that the present value effect of the 
tax savings from debt cannot be computed as the present value of the tax shield associated 
with interest payments. They explain that value-additivity is violated even provided the 
complete capital structure. That is why adjusted present value formulae cannot be used.  
In the world with presence of corporate taxes and absence of all other factors of imperfect 
markets, the firm’s value is an increasing function of leverage (Figure 1.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Effect of tax benefit on firm’s value (Hickman et al., 1996) 
Figure 2.1 explains three different firm values: the value given interest paid after taxes, the 
value given interest paid before taxes, and the value in perfect markets. One can observe that 
tax has a strong effect on the firm’s value which is negative when interest is paid after tax, 
and positive in the opposite situation. Positive effect depends on the amount of debt’s tax 
shield.  
To calculate savings from the difference between pre-tax and after-tax rate of borrowing we 
assume the following:  
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− there is enough taxable income each period to claim the interest tax deduction.  
After-tax cost of borrowing can be computed as follows (Damodaran, 2001): 
   After − tax	cost	of	debt = r ∗ (1 − T)        (4) 
Presence of personal tax makes another influence on MM’s proposition than corporate tax. 
Miller (1977) shows that value of the levered firm under assumption of personal taxes is: 
     V' = V. + G'         (5) 
where, GL is the tax advantage, which equals: 
    G' = 71 − (
89:)∗(
89;<)(
89;=) > ∗ B         (6) 
where, Tpd – personal tax rate on income from owning bonds; Tps – personal tax rate on 
income from owning stock; Tc – corporate tax rate. 
Amounts of tax benefit from the corporate and personal taxes are not equal and depend on the 
rates of interest payments to bondholders and stockholders. 
Philippatos and Sihler (1991) prove that with the assumption of non-debt tax shields, 
corporate tax benefits of leverage disappear after increasing use of the debt. Miller’s 
equilibrium completely eliminates the advantage of debt. This assumption is shown by the 
following equation (Philippatos and Sihler, 1991): 
    
(1 − T?) ∗ @1 − TABC = (1 − TA*)          (7) 
This formula completely expels debt advantage and describes assumptions under well-known 
MM irrelevance proportion. 
Miller (1977) suggests that the value of the firm, in equilibrium, does not depend from capital 
structure, even despite a tax deductibility of interest payments in computing corporate income 
taxes (Tc). 
With regards to the tax benefits of debt Hickman et al. (1996) concluded that the higher the 
tax bracket in which firm finds itself, the greater the tax-shielding benefit of debt will be and 
the more leverage the firm should employ in its capital structure. On the other hand, firms 
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with large tax-loss carry-forwards or high depreciation expenses collect less benefit from 
leverage’s tax shield and choose lower levels of debt. 
Damodaran (2001) gives few predictions related to taxes and optimal financing mix: 
− firms with non-debt tax shields should be less likely to use debt than firms without them; 
− as tax rates increase, debt ratios are supposed to grow up as well, thus reflecting the 
higher tax benefits of debt; 
− debt ratios in countries where debt has a much larger tax benefit are expected to be higher 
than in countries where debt has a lower tax benefit. 
Tax advantage of debt is usually opposed to the costs that debt financing incurs with expected 
bankruptcy costs being the most significant of all. 
2.3.2. Expected bankruptcy costs from debt 
Due to the fact that any debt is an obligation requiring timely payment of interest and 
principal, debt puts a serious pressure on a company increasing the risk of its financial 
distress. The ultimate distress is bankruptcy which is the condition when a firm is unable to 
meet its contractual commitments. The 100% equity financed firm also has a chance to go 
bankrupt if it is unable to pay salaries to its employees. The probability of bankruptcy is the 
likelihood that the firm’s cash flows will be insufficient to meet its promised debt obligations. 
The probability of bankruptcy is therefore a function of two following factors (Damodaran, 
2001): 
− Size of operating cash flows relative to the size of cash flows on debt obligations. Here, 
the larger are the differences between incoming and outgoing cash flows, the less is the 
probability of not meeting financial obligations. The smaller is the cash flow margin, the 
more likely it is that the bankruptcy may occur. 
− Variance in operating cash flows. Among two firms with the same operating cash flows, 
the one with more stable and predictable ones will less likely go bankrupt. The more 
volatile and unanticipated cash flows give no guarantee that a firm is able to meet its debt 
obligations regularly. 
To calculate expected costs of financial distress one needs to multiply the costs of bankruptcy 
by the probability of financial distress (Ryen et al., 1997). Therefore, the main proposition 
14 
 
follows: the higher the costs of bankruptcy and/or the probability of financial distress based 
on the firm’s operational cash flows, the less debt should a firm use. 
Bankruptcy costs are said to include two components – their direct and indirect part. Direct 
costs of bankruptcy appear at the very moment of financial distress and refer to the cash 
outflows to cover legal and administrative costs connected to the bankruptcy procedure. They 
also include additional payments for the delays in paying out cash flows. It is not the direct 
bankruptcy costs that make the companies maintain low debt ratios but the indirect ones. 
Indirect costs appear before the exact bankruptcy but have a more significant effect on the 
company’s cash flows. These costs include the loss in revenues that that may occur due to the 
1) customers’, 2) suppliers’, 3) employees’, or/and 4) equity investors’ perception that the 
firm is in trouble. Namely, customers can stop buying company’s products, suppliers can 
demand stricter contract terms, employees can prefer to quit their jobs, and investors – both 
equity and debt ones – may reject to provide financing for good new projects being afraid to 
take any risk. Kwansa and Cho (1995) proved the indirect bankruptcy cost to be substantial in 
absolute terms. Thus, the trade-off between tax savings and indirect bankruptcy costs can 
serve as an appropriate signal of the potential firm insolvency.   
Based on the abovementioned formula for bankruptcy cots calculation Damodaran (2001) 
makes four implications on the relation between firms’ capital structures and bankruptcy costs 
(Damodaran, 2001): 
1. Firms acting in the markets with volatile earnings and unstable cash flows should have 
less debt, than the firms with stable regular and predictable cash flows. 
2. Firms able to structure their debt in such a way that interest and principal payments 
change together with the amount of operating cash flows can afford to borrow more.  
3. Given the bankruptcy protection from any external entity, e.g. government or agency, 
allows to take more debt. 
4. Tangibility and liquidity of the company’s underlying assets provides a basis for 
borrowing more.  
Most studies show that the threat of bankruptcy does impact the capital structure as far as the 
over-leveraged firm obliged to larger fixed interest charges from the greater use of debt 
financing has a high probability that a decline its earnings will cause financial distress. 
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The effect that bankruptcy costs have on the firm’s value is shown in Figure 2. In it we see 
that the straight ascending line showing the growth of the firm’s value with leverage increase 
given the tax benefit only, changes its form when bankruptcy costs are introduced. As before 
debt still provides a shield and increases firm’s value up to a certain point after which the 
value growth slows down and with some more leverage added firm’s value reduction is 
observed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Leverage’s effect on the firm’s value with taxes and bankruptcy costs 
(Hickman et al., 1996) 
Consequently, introduction of bankruptcy costs in the model reduces tax benefit of debt and 
may even annul it completely.  
Cross-country variation in bankruptcy codes also affects companies’ capital structure choice. 
The firm’s anticipated liquidation value appears to be the key influencing factor. In detail, 
firms with low liquidation values employ greater leverage under a bankruptcy code favoring 
equity-holders than under the one favoring debt-holders, and the difference in optimal debt 
levels under the former and the latter represents itself a decreasing function of the degree of 
liquidation values (Acharya et al., 2011). 
Apart from its main benefit, tax shield, and its main cost, bankruptcy cost, debt has other positive 
and negative implications, which are worth taking into account when increasing the amount of 
leverage. One advantage of debt is the fact that debt helps to control managers’ behavior less 
costly. It increases internal discipline in a company and this beneficial issue is discussed below. 
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2.3.3. Discipline of debt and solution to the principal-agent problem 
In 1976 Jensen together with the group of practitioners and academics noticed and described 
another benefit resulting from debt financing. They investigated the common problem of free 
cash flows – wasteful investments done by managers. Free cash flows result from the 
operations over which managers have discretionary spending power. In the abovementioned 
work researchers criticize managers of the firms with no or hardly any debt for inefficiency in 
project choice and money allocation. The existence of significant cash flows and absence of 
any debt obligations allows these managers to make crucial mistakes decreasing the firm’s 
value. 
The problem of managers’ discipline is closely connected to the agency problem which deals 
with the desire of managers to pursue their own goals, rather than the company’s targets. It 
happens as a result of the separation of ownership and management in the firm. Executives 
make the key decisions in a company and know more about firm’s activities than most 
shareholders. Therefore, the former have the possibility to manipulate the company to 
increase their own profits. Generally, agency costs could be defined as the costs from the 
conflicts of interest among stockholders, bondholders, and managers (Ross et al., 2008). 
Hickman et al. (1996) suppose that agency problem arises under conditions of information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. He also assumes that this problem can be 
solved by using more debt that disciplines managers. 
There are two ways to reduce excess cash flows. One way is to increase shareholders 
dividends. As dividends are paid, free cash flows are reduced. Another way is to shift the 
capital structure toward more debt as higher debt service requirements force managers to be 
more disciplined. Consequently, the idea of discipline of debt is to bind cash flows and hold 
managers under pressure for the purpose of getting the best interest for stockholders. In fact, 
interest and principal payments have a greater effect on discipline than dividends because the 
possibility of financial default is a far more significant problem to solve than the unsatisfied 
shareholders. Dividend payout is not an obligation, whereas debt payments are. This 
difference between the equity commitment and the inflexibility of the debt commitment has 
led some to call equity a cushion and debt a sword. The way how the firm’s value is affected 
by the discipline of debt is illustrated in Figure 3.  
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Figure 2.3. Leverage and firm’s value when 1) markets are perfect, 2) taxes are 
introduced, 3) with bankruptcy costs included, and 4) considering the discipline of debt 
(Hickman et al., 1996) 
As was shown above on Figure 3 the discipline of debt has a positive influence on the firm 
value, despite the negative effect of bankruptcy costs which is increasing simultaneously with 
leverage. Straight line shows that debt provides a positive effect of tax shield, but due to the 
bankruptcy costs and discipline of debt it changes the direction and the form. 
Harvey et al. (2004) indicates extreme managerial agency problems in emerging market firms. 
Researchers consider that debt creates shareholders value for firms that face high agency 
costs. Also, they propose a way how to solve the problem of the separation of control and 
ownership in the management group. It is connected with results from subsequent issues of 
international syndicated term loans and especially with abnormal returns from these loans.  
The discipline of debt argument states that firm’s managers become more efficient and their 
firms more valuable as leverage increases. It is natural that countries in which stockholders 
power to influence manager is minimal the debt ratios of firms will be much lower than is 
optimal for these firms because manager enjoy a more comfortable existence by carrying less 
debt than they can afford (Damodaran, 2001).  From this point discipline of debt is a benefit 
which may be set off by agency costs.  
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Vos and Forlong (1996) make few suggestions about the agency advantage of debt according to 
the different stages of the firm life-cycle. Figure 4 shows debt advantage changes over small, the 
initial public offering, and the mature-listed stages of the firm life-cycle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Changes in the advantage of debt over the firm life-cycle (Vos and Forlong, 1996: 
28) 
High agency costs of debt bring an insignificant agency advantage for the firm at the small 
business stage. There is opposite situation for the initial public offering and the mature-listed 
stages, where agency advantage of debt becomes significant. Especially it is very strong for 
mature listed stage of the firm life-cycle. 
In spite of all the argument for the debt, stockholders should not forget that too much debt 
may overload the manager. Underinvestment problem arises under this assumption. Managers 
may lose a lot of investment opportunities being under the pressure of stockholders. Facing a 
risky project with positive-NPV manager may reject it even though stockholder will find the 
risk acceptable. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) identified three forms of the agency costs: 
1) deadweight losses from missed profitable investment opportunities are considered as part 
of the agency cost associated with using the debt; 
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2) costs of monitoring the firm’s managers’ behavior and binding costs are a part of 
principal-agent relationship. Binding cost is a loss in performance of the firm’s managers 
related to the bondholder’s claim on the firm; 
3) bankruptcy and reorganization associated costs. 
Enumerated agency costs contribute to the decline in a value of a firm. Therefore, it is the 
responsibility of stockholders to decide how much leverage to use in order to balance tax 
benefits and agency costs associated with debt. 
2.3.4. Agency costs of borrowing 
Often stockholders are not just equity investors but act as firm’s managers who are lenders’ 
agents. In this case conflict of interests does not disappear, as stockholders make actions that 
increase the firm’s value even if it means increasing the risks. Bondholders want to preserve 
and increase the security of their claims. Regardless of protective actions from bondholders’ 
side stakeholders’ interests dominate because generally equity investors control the firm’s 
management and decision making. Consequently agency costs of debt arise. They include the 
price of higher interest rates and the loss of freedom in decision making (Damodaran, 2001).  
Damodaran (2001) singles out three aspects in which the conflict between stockholders and 
bondholders appears:  
1) choosing of projects;  
2) ways of financing these projects;  
3) amount of dividends. 
When bondholders lend their money they expect to get interest payments based on the risk of 
projects in which this money will be invested. If a firm chooses riskier projects than expected, 
bondholders lose on their existing holdings as the price of the holdings decreases to reflect the 
higher risks (Damodaran, 2001). Stockholders, on the contrary, get benefit not only from 
implementing positive-NPV projects but also from transferring wealth from the bondholders 
to the firm.  
Conflict becomes worse when stockholders give new lenders prior claims over existing ones 
hoping the actual interest rates to go down as new bondholders get involved. The 
stockholders’ desire to keep the firm’s default risk low is not supported by bondholders who 
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do not want to lose their prior claims and make the existing debt less valuable. Dividend 
payments and equity repurchase also make bondholders dissatisfied, as bond prices react 
negatively to the increases in dividends but remain relatively unaffected by dividend 
decreases. Bondholders prefer the firm to retain the cash and use it to make payments on the 
debt. Dividend payments and equity repurchase also make bondholders dissatisfied. Certainly, 
bond prices react negatively to the increases in dividends but remain relatively unaffected by 
dividend decreases.  
Bondholders can protect themselves against described losses by adding the following 
covenants to lending agreements (Damodaran, 2001):  
− keep the firm away from taking riskier projects, e.g. by getting a veto power over 
investment decisions; 
− have the chance to sell bonds back to the firm at face value; 
− restrict dividends to a certain percentage of earnings or limit dividend increase to a 
specified amount; 
− use hybrid securities, which may reduce agency costs, for example convertible bonds that 
give the opportunity for bondholders to convert their holdings into equity. 
Such covenants have consequences in the form of the following real costs though: the direct 
cost of monitoring the covenants and the indirect cost of lost investments. Both costs increase 
as the covenants become more detailed and restrictive. Obviously, agency cost is greater in a 
firm whose investments cannot be easily observed and monitored, and whose projects are 
long term and follow unpredictable paths.  
Ross et al. (2008) describe three kinds of selfish strategies that stockholders use to protect 
themselves in a situation with high probability of bankruptcy or financial distress:  
1) incentive to take large risks; 
2) incentive toward underinvestment; 
3) milking the property.  
First strategy implies that stockholders do not feel enough responsibility for the bondholders’ 
money and take greater risks as the company approaches financial default. Second strategy is 
executed by the stockholders who find out that new investments help the bondholders at the 
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stockholders’ expense. Strategy number 3 assumes that stockholders-managers should pay 
extra dividends in times of financial distress and leave fewer earnings for bondholders.  
For the firms following these strategies debt is difficult and costly to obtain. As a result, these 
firms have low debt ratios.  
2.3.5. Non-equilibrium effects on capital structure 
If a firm’s capital structure was affected by several equilibrium factors mentioned in the 
previous section only, capital structure choice would be much easier than it actually is. Apart 
from the industrywide factors such as tax deductibility of interest, business disruption, and 
agency costs, a range of non-equilibrium, or firm specific factors has an effect on a firm. Non-
equilibrium factors are primarily company specific and are subject to more frequent and 
significant changes. One can name an infinite number of such factors, but this work covers 
only main ones. 
Investigation of firms’ capital structure decisions leads a researcher to the identification of 
certain patterns in the companies’ attitude to debt at various stages of their life cycles. From 
foundation to winding-up, any firm passes several stages which can be characterized by 
certain indicators changing through the life of a firm. These indicators are revenues/earnings, 
costs (mainly, bankruptcy and agency ones; loss of flexibility), and benefits (tax shield, 
discipline increase). Based on their value numerous studies explain companies’ behavior in 
relation to debt differently.  
Classical theory states that start-up firms and those in the growth stage tend to avoid using 
debt actively until the point when their cash flows become stable and predictable. Since then 
debt ratios start rising and peak at the point when firms reach their mature stage. At that 
moment of time debt becomes a very attractive option, because it brings the highest tax 
benefits contradicted to very low bankruptcy and agency costs. In the decline stage a dramatic 
decrease in earnings and the gradual increase in bankruptcy costs are followed by the fall in 
debt use (Damodaran, 2001). Therefore, the classical theory concentrates on the tradeoff 
between firms’ earnings, debt benefits and risks associated to it at every stage of life cycle.  
Recent studies, however, contradict a lot with the abovementioned classical view. All 
empirical research supports the pecking order theory in more or less detail. Pinkova and 
Kaminkova (2012) examined 50 companies of Czech automotive industry and revealed the 
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following dependence of companies’ debt ratios on their stages in life cycle: stages of birth, 
growth and decline are characterized by the high debt use, whereas equity capital is preferred 
in the mature stage. Byungmo and Jungwon (2009) got similar results, but they went deeper 
in understanding the reasons of their findings. They initially proposed that firms’ capital 
structures are affected by the interplay between funding requirements and availability of 
internal funds, and found an indicator to express this interplay – retained earnings. What was 
investigated in the study is the relation between retained earnings differing at various stages 
of a firm’s lifecycle, and leverage. The results show the distinctive inverted-U-shaped relation 
between leverage and retained earnings and suggest that firms with low retained earnings 
(birth stage) keep low levels of debt because of the existing financial constraints and their 
corresponding significant reliance on external equity. Medium level of retained earnings lets 
firms use a lot of debt to finance growth (growth stage), and high level of retained earnings 
(mature stage) is followed by the decrease in debt use due to the excess of own internal 
funding. Byungmo and Jungwon (2009) argue that the traditional leverage regression 
overestimates the states with extremely high and low retained earnings, and underestimates 
the state when firms have medium level of retained earnings. La Rocca et al. (2011) went in 
detail on this topic and find out in their research that higher profitability lets managers be less 
dependent on creditors in mature firms, while young firms and start-ups are still more 
dependent on debt for business support. Start-ups and young firms need a lot of debt, which is 
the most obvious source of financing they can find at that stage of life cycle. So, pecking 
order theory is mostly approved at the mature stage, when firms rebalance their capital 
structure and use more internal financing. This study also found out that life cycle patterns are 
consistent over time, within different institutional contexts and more or less dominant for 
different industries. Due to this conclusion we have the right, to distinguish life cycle 
hypothesis from other ones. Study by Frielinghaus, et al. (2005) also provides support for 
pecking order theory, rather than the existing classical theory, and suggests that business risk 
is not a major consideration in the capital structure decision.  
Firms at the same stage in the life cycle may still have differences with regards to the use of debt. 
These differences can sometimes be explained by the nature of the business they are dealing with 
and the type of assets involved in it. 
Capital structure is dependent on the firms’ assets because of arising agency and bankruptcy 
costs. The tendency is that firms using tangible assets with high liquidity use more debt, than 
those using intangible ones. Filbeck and Gorman (2000) observed a positive relationship 
23 
 
between leverage and asset utilization in their study of mining, oil and timber industries. 
Tangible non-specific assets can be sold easily at any time and will not lose in value in the 
case of financial distress. What is more, it is much easier to monitor these assets, e.g. plant 
and equipment, compared to intangible ones. Value of the firm, customer loyalty and other 
intangible assets demand large advertising expenses to be built and maintained. Apart from 
that they are absolutely unstable and may be devaluated if customers, suppliers, and etc. find 
out that company is close to bankruptcy (Melicher, 2003).  
Knowledge based firms relying in their business mostly on intangible assets face severe 
information asymmetries between their founders and banks. Banks require fixed assets as 
collateral and are reluctant to provide funds to high-technology businesses. In such cases the 
primary source of external financing is equity mostly provided by business angels and venture 
capitalists (Hogan and Hutson, 2005). 
In respect to ideas mentioned above we can conclude that cash flows generated by optimal type of 
financing and by the firm’s assets should be similar. In case, to reduce default risk, increase 
borrowing capacity, and increase firm’s value manager seeks ways to finance long-term assets 
with long-term debt and nondollar assets with nondollar debt (Damodaran, 2001). 
Now when all the determinants of capital structure that are subject to the current research are 
covered, we continue the discussion by introducing two main theories based on which companies 
set their debt to equity ratios. Pecking order and tradeoff theory are investigated in more detail as 
being the dominant ones. 
2.4. Capital structure theories 
Two main theories related to the way capital structure choice is made dominate the financial 
structure literature: static tradeoff theory and pecking order theory. Chirinko and Singha 
(2000) suppose that both of them are introducing frictions that were omitted in the MM 
framework. Researchers try to compare them through testing and explain which theory gives 
better assumptions about the optimal capital structure. Actually, there is one more theory 
described in theoretical works which focused on financial police. It is the agency theory that 
we mentioned above as a discipline of debt and agency borrowing costs.  In this part of the 
work we present the context of another two main theories that have a deal with financial 
policy, and models they use for capital structure building.   
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2.4.1. Static trade-off theory 
It is reasonable to start from static tradeoff theory, which deals with the tradeoff between all 
the capital structure determinants, namely debt benefits and its costs. Static tradeoff is a 
single-period model which uses a single constant rate for taxation. It assumes that an optimal 
capital structure forms around a target debt ratio desirable for a firm (Jong et al., 2011). 
Managers try to adjust capital structure period by period. For this purpose they compare costs 
of debt when they are getting bad results and the tax benefits of debt when they are doing well 
(Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). In such way they find the desirable tradeoff.  
Chirinko and Singha (2000) made an assumption that static tradeoff theory introduces 
following frictions, omitted by MM: agency cost and the tax deductibility of debt financing. 
Grinblatt and Titman (1998) also discussed such friction as expected costs of financial 
distress. The effect which these frictions have on the value (V) of a levered firm can be 
expressed by the following formula (Damodaran, 2001): 
       V'()((*	+,- = V./0()((*	+,- + tax	shield − expected	costs	of	+inancial	distress     (8) 
The equation above clearly shows the positive effect of tax shield and negative effect of 
expected costs of bankruptcy on the value of levered firm. 
Static tradeoff model gives an opportunity to find the debt ratio which is appropriate for the 
firm based on the frictions and target debt ratio. Regression function is the simplest way to 
show the relationship between debt ratio and risk, asset type, tax status and profitability 
(Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999): 
EFG = H + I
 ∗ JKHLMG	 + IN ∗ O&QG	 + IR ∗ SHTG	 + IU ∗ VHWLXLYZG	     (9) 
where, dit – debt ratio; Plant is the ratio of plant and equipment to sales or assets; R&D is the 
ratio of research and development expenditures to sales or assets; Tax is the ratio of taxes paid 
to sales or assets, and Earnings is the ratio of operating earnings to sales or assets. 
It is worth noting that debt ratio is negatively related to the firm’s past profitability, R&D 
expenditures, advertising and selling expenses. Values of coefficients (a, b1, b2, b3, b4) depend 
on specifications of a particular industry. Their meaning will be the same for one industry 
though because empirical findings made on the basis of static tradeoff theory, show that firms 
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have a tendency to choose similar capital structure in the same industry (Grinblatt and 
Titman, 1998).   
Another regression function is used to explain the change in debt ratio through the deviation 
between current and desirable debt ratio (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999): 
    ∆EFG = H + I\] ∗ EFG
∗ − EFG8
	 + ^FG                (10) 
where, ∆dit – the change in debt ratio; EFG∗  – target debt ratio; EFG8
 – current debt ratio; bTA is 
a target adjustment coefficient taken as a sample-wide constant; εit – residual. 
This regression function has a disadvantage. It is very hard to observe a target debt ratio and 
determine it.   
Empirical works in the field of debt-equity choice highlight adjustment to a target leverage 
ratio as a cornerstone of trade-off models. There are variables that systematically affect 
capital structure, but a lot of factors are country or industry specific. Gaud (2007) finds that 
the determinants of capital structure for US companies are similar for EU firms. He singles 
out such factors as size, growth, profitability, importance of tangible assets. Moreover, he 
suggests that for identification the fundamental determinants of financial mix it is important 
to make a thorough investigation of bankruptcy law, fiscal treatment, ownership 
concentration, accounting standards. Gaud (2007) tries to answer on question: “To what 
extant does the nation environment affect debt-equity choices…” and proposed next 
regression model: 
DTCM, = α + βbcd ∗ SIZE, + β9ijk ∗ TANG, + βmni ∗ ROA, + βibq ∗ CASH, + βs9t ∗
																		MTB, + βm9 ∗ RET, + βi9i ∗ ATA, + ^FG       (11) 
where, DTCM – the ratio of total financial debt to total capital, α – constant, βSIZE, βTANG, 
βROA, βCASH, βMTB, βRET, βATA – coefficients of independent variables, SIZEi – the natural 
logarithm of sales, TANGi – the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, ROAi – the ratio of 
EBITDA to total assets, CASHi – the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, MTBi 
– the ratio of the market value of assets to total assets, RETi – the ratio of the annual change 
in the market value of equity at the begging of the year, ATAi – the ratio of depreciation and 
amortization to total assets. 
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What should be pointed is that in reality managers forget to optimize capital structure period 
by period as static tradeoff theory suggests, but use a more dynamic process for its 
determination. Obviously, the firm’s current debt ratio deviates from its long-term optimal or 
target debt ratio (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). 
2.4.2. Pecking order theory 
Opposed to the static capital structure theory is a theory based on the pecking order of 
financing choices (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). It states that due to presence of asymmetric 
information and high costs flotations firms adopt own financial hierarchy according to which 
capital is raised. Of course, this hierarchy depends on number of factors. Before answering 
the question of what are the elements of financial hierarchy, provided by pecking order 
theory, it is significant to give few explanations of pecking order behavior. Grinblatt and 
Titman (1998) comment that retained earnings and debt are preferred to equity as a source of 
investments due to the existence of taxes and transaction costs. It is not so easy for managers 
to issue new equity, because this process could not be realized without the approval of the 
board of directors. Additionally, it brings more outside scrutiny. In this case, it is better to 
involve debt capital which is not so strictly controlled by the board of directors. Managers can 
manipulate the behavior of stockholders through issuing equity which conveys false 
information to stockholders. Also, having a high debt ratio helps to get a concession from 
employees and suppliers.  
Managers also follow the rate of needed flexibility and control when choosing the source of 
capital. External financing reduces flexibility for future financing and control, making 
managers prefer retained earnings as a source of capital. Apart from that, it is more costly to 
use external debt and external equity compared to retained earnings (Damodaran, 2001).  
Taking into account all the previous comments Brigham and Ehkhardt (2011) present 
financial hierarchy illustrated in Figure 4. Here the most preferable source of financing is 
shown on the left side and the preference of sources decreases as ones move to the right 
towards the least preferred source of financing – convertible preferred debt.  
 
Figure 2.5. The financial hierarchy by Brigham and Ehkhardt (2011)
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regression gives a good description of debt financing over a wide range of moderate debt 
ratios.  
Chen (2012) follows Frank and Goyal (2003) and proposed more useful regression model of 
leverage. As a Frank and Goyal (2003) he took four factors that have influence on leverage: 
tangibility of assets (T), market-to-book ratio (MTB), log of sales (SL), and profitability (P). 
Scientist preferred to use levels of leverage against changes in leverage. So, he replaced 
financing deficit (DEF) with cumulative financing deficit (CDEF) (Chen et al., 2012). He 
proposed next regression model: 
    QFG = ~ + \ ∗ SFG + \ ∗ SFG +  ∗ FG + v ∗ JFG +  ∗ }QVuFG + ^FG    (14) 
where, Dit – long-term debt, α – constant, βT, βMTB, βLS, βP, βCDEF – factors coefficients, εit – 
residual. 
The idea of research was to show dependency between long-term debt and determined factors, 
and check that βT > 0, βMTB < 0, βLS > 0, βP < 0, βCDEF > 0.   
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) suggest two conditions when firms can add equity. First, the 
debt ratio is painfully high. Second, the debt ratio is approaching zero or a firm is a net lender.  
As an inference, Ross et al. (2008) give two rules which pecking order theory provides for the 
real world:  
• use internal financing;  
• issue safe securities first.  
Jong et al. (2011) explain the role of both theories in the formation process of the debt-equity 
decisions. According to the empirical analysis, pecking order theory has more explanatory 
power for issue decisions. As for repurchase decisions pecking order depends on manager’s 
degree of optimism (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). The static tradeoff theory has more 
influence on repurchase decisions than on issue decisions. Firms use repurchases decisions to 
move towards their target debt ratio. It is worth noting that empirical analysis for issue 
decisions focuses on over levered firms without restrictions in their debt issuing. Meanwhile 
for repurchase decisions analysis focuses on under levered firms that do have sufficient debt 
outstanding to be repurchased (Jong et al., 2011). 
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2.4.3. Essential assumptions and hypotheses stated  
Trade-off and pecking order theories together with discussed above factors give a base for our 
investigation. With respect to our goals it is time to make main assumptions and hypotheses 
of the current research. 
As the first assumption we will use Hickman’s conclusion (1996: 409) about tax benefits of 
debt: “the higher the tax bracket in which firm finds itself… the more leverage the firm 
should employ in its capital structure”. 
Hypothesis I: taxes paid and debt ratio coefficients have a positive linear relationship. 
Hypothesis I*: taxes paid and debt ratio coefficients have a negative linear relationship. 
Second assumption sorts out from Damodaran’s (2001) comments about probability of 
bankruptcy: larger firms have more stable and predictable cash flows and higher target debt 
levels. 
Hypothesis II: sale and debt ratio coefficients have a positive linear dependence. 
Hypothesis II*: sale and debt ratio coefficients have a negative linear dependence. 
We take Damodaran’s (2001) implication on the relation between firms’ capital structures and 
bankruptcy costs as a third assumption: tangibility of the company’s assets provides a basis 
for borrowing more. 
Hypothesis III: tangible assets and debt ratio coefficients have a positive linear relationship. 
Hypothesis III*: tangible assets and debt ratio coefficients have a negative linear relationship. 
Fourth assumption: One of the main ideas of the discipline of debt is to bind cash flows 
(Hickman et al., 1996). 
Hypothesis IV: cash flow and debt ratio coefficients have a negative linear dependence. 
Hypothesis IV*: cash flow and debt ratio coefficients have a positive linear dependence. 
Fifth assumption: Higher operating profitability increases free cash flows.  
Hypothesis V: profitability and debt ratio coefficient have a negative linear relationship. 
Hypothesis V*: profitability and debt ratio coefficient have a positive linear relationship 
We use observations of Filbeck and Gorman (2000) for our sixth assumption: intangible 
assets demand large advertising expenses to be built and maintained. It is hard to monitor this 
kind of assets, and they will lose in value in the case of financial distress. 
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Hypothesis VI: Intangible assets and debt ratio coefficients have a negative linear 
dependence. 
Hypothesis VI*: Intangible assets and debt ratio coefficients have a positive linear 
dependence. 
Check of these hypotheses will help to indentify strength and direction of dependence 
between determined factors and debt ratio in oil and gas industry.   
2.5. Summary 
The theoretical chapter is literature review of capital structure choice. It helps to understand 
main assumptions and determinants of financial mix. Initial section explains interconnection 
between capital structure and value of the firm. It gives explanations to what is optimal debt 
ratio choice and how it’s important for firm’s value. The classical theorem of Modigliani and 
Miller shows the irrelevance of capital structure in the perfect market setting. But in 
changeable environment firms have a deal with market imperfections. Numerous factors 
influence optimal debt ratio choices. It is very important to find a trade-off between benefits 
(tax deductibility of interest and discipline of debt) and costs (bankruptcy, agency, loss of 
flexibility) of debt. Managers should not forget about country, industry and firm specific 
factors (stage in the life cycle, type of assets). Last section presents trade-off and pecking 
order theories. Trade-off theory assumes that an optimal capital structure forms around a 
target debt ratio desirable for a firm. In turn pecking order theory states that due to presence 
of asymmetric information and high costs flotations firms adopt own financial hierarchy. 
Finally, we single out main assumptions and state six hypotheses. They suppose to show real 
dependence between determined factors and debt ratio in oil and gas industry. 
  
3. Methodological chapter
Current chapter highlights the idea how to manage the study.  First of all we propose a 
research plan. It helps the reader to understand investigation stage by stage. After the logic of 
paper is given we continue with literature review. Here we remind abou
involved in the study and how our investigation differ from them. Research design helps to 
organize research activity. We propose a way of its construction and explain how it helps to 
solve research questions. Next stage is preparing of
processing. We determine the type of data, and its sources, explain population and define 
sample size. Finally, quality of the research is discussed. It realizes through concepts of 
causality, generalizability and rel
proposed.  
3.1. Research plan 
To make the reader more familiar and easy going with study theme i
this chapter with detailed research plan. Compare suggestion of Easterby
and Saunders et al. (2009) about classical research plan we propose modified and more 
suitable one for our investigation. Figure 3.1 presents its graphical form.
 
1 • Formulation of reserch topic
2 • Literature review and theory examination
3 • Define assumptions and hypotheses
4 • Formulating the research design
5 • Data collection and processing
6 • Estimation of variables and their implementation in economic model
7 • The results interpretation
 
 a methodology for data collection and 
iability. The software and data specific limitations are 
t is reasonable to start 
-
 
Figure 3.1. Research plan 
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t the main theories 
Smith et al. (2008) 
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Actually, all these elements were mentioned above. They look very simple and give 
impression that paper work goes logically.  But we want to emphasize, it is necessary to 
perform step-by-step and make each part of paper more and more accessible for our reader. 
We agreed with Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) that sometimes it is even useful for writer to 
repeat information mentioned previously. It gives possibility do not lose a logic of study and 
focus attention on the research questions. In this case small literature review will revive in 
reader’s memory what already we know about the debt ratio choice, main critical comments, 
and how our research differs from other empirical praxis. 
3.2. Literature review 
Making literature review we found that even there are huge amount of information resources 
it is still very difficult to discover appropriate and reliable ones. Attentive work with literature 
gave the necessary understanding of the problem of capital structure choice. Unfortunately, 
theory is week compare to environment changeability. New and new problems arise. Works 
of Hovakimian (2004) about roles of pecking order and trade-off theories, Gaud et. al. (2007) 
about national environment influence on debt ratio choices, Rajan and Zingales (1995) about 
dependence of target debt from international aspects and finally Shyame-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) with their dynamic and static models give us whole understanding of importance of 
debt ration choices. These works are the base for our investigation, be more precisely, based 
on them and of course on assumption of classical theorem of Modigliani and Miller we 
generate a set of factors influencing capital structure decisions. Analyze of economical 
tendencies (analytical reports, financial newspapers, media) in the world opened for us 
changes of business cycle in oil and gas industry. Oppose mentioned above researchers we 
decided to make more narrow study and find to what extent does this set of factors influence 
debt ratio choice in oil and gas industry. Our idea was to make a puzzle from different studies 
connected with capital structure choice. We suggest that it provides better connection between 
assumptions of perfect capital markets, imperfections of current markets and industry 
specificity of debt ratio choice.  
Unfortunately corporate finance literature does not give answer on question what is the 
optimal financial mix and even does not provide information about all aspects of debt ratio 
choice. A lot of theoretical sources repeated the same. But there were sources very valuable 
for our research: Brigham and Ehrhard (2011), Damodaran (2001), Hickman et. al. (2005), 
Ross et. al. (2008). They provide our study with essential theory base and main critical 
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comments.  Brooks (2008) and Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) gave the main ideas how to 
collect and process data, formulate quantitative model and interpret result. As we mentioned 
above, this a quantitative research, so an econometrical literature is a base for necessary 
restriction of data collection, modeling, and results interpretation. 
In order to solve research problem it is time to organize research activity. Someone can 
suppose that it will be more appropriate to speak first about philosophy of study. We allow 
speaking Easterby-Smith et al. (2008: 83) instead of us: “…quantitative and qualitative 
methods may be used according to both constructionist and positivist epistemologies, and be 
underpinned by both nominalist and realist ontology”. Therefore, we do not appeal to 
philosophy of study but continue with research design. 
3.3. Research design 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) explains that the main idea of research design is to organize 
research activity. He suggests, process of data collection should be organized in a way of 
comprehensive support of the research questions solving.  
Idea of the work paper builds around the set of factors and their influence on debt ratio 
choice. Usage of specific econometric tools and methods depends from the scale of qualitative 
data.  We have a deal with factors measurement within the each element of sample and 
measurement of average meaning for whole population. The research purpose is to find in 
what extant determined factors influence debt ratio choice checking provided hypotheses. 
Exactly they show relationships between variables (factors) and debt ratio. But these 
relationships are theoretically based and so using econometric estimation we want to check 
true relationships inside the sets of data exploited. In this case econometric tools and methods 
will be used. However, existence of mathematical models leads to necessity of their   
verification. It should be emphasized that we do not forget about existence of causal 
relationships between factors. Fourth and fifth hypotheses have strong strict correlation. 
Profitability increase leads to higher amount of cash flow form operational activities. The 
problem of this situation placed behind agency hypothesis (see discipline of debt and agency 
borrowing costs).  
Type of research depends on reason of investigation, its content and what study gives for 
community. Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) determines tree main types of research: explanatory, 
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descriptive and causal. Using explanatory investigation we are going to highlight the nature of 
the debt ratio choices. Saunders et al. (2009) suggest that explanatory research is using to 
establish causal relationships between variables. Determination of the cause of dependence 
between variables is also very important for understanding whole picture around debt ratio 
choice and especially around the desire of firms to get the target debt ratio.  
Now it is time to describe logic and algorithm of the research design. The theoretical chapter 
provides main economic theories with respect to capital structure and evidence of previous 
studies that support our investigation with theoretical approval of chosen topic. Experience in 
finding trade-off between benefits and costs of debt, attempts to explain firm’s desirable 
financial hierarchy, and especially works of Gaud et. al. (2007) and Shyame-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) provide dynamic and static theoretical models that are a base for future 
estimations. More precisely this step will be discussed in empirical chapter. Next step in 
research design is data collection and processing. We will talk about reliable sample and other 
impotent conditions of generating data sets in next section. The empirical chapter will provide 
variables estimation and their implementation into econometric model. We will give an 
explanation of calculation process and speak about adequacy of variables, especially how to 
make model statistically adequate using proposed set of variables. Estimated variables and 
model interpretation will be provided in the analytical chapter. 
3.4. Data collection and processing 
First of all should be noted that current research will based on secondary date, and the main 
task of data collection is to get data that the best fit to solving research questions. As we know 
primary data is more reliable compare to secondary data. But with respect to our study it 
almost the same, because variables estimation will base on information from financial 
statements of firms. Sources of this information could be different from archives to 
government departments. During the process of collecting data we did not feel difficulties 
because all listed companies provide annual reports on their websites. Unfortunately, further it 
was not so ease, because huge amount of data should be compared and sorted out.  
As we mentioned previously oil and gas industry is the object of research. All firms perform 
in this industry put together a population. As a sample we took a set of firms conduct in 
European region. This choice is explained by following facts: higher number of firms is 
dealing in oil and gas industry located in European region; most of them listed in London or 
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New York stock exchanges; they submit to one general law regulation; national aspects of 
factors influence on debt ratio choice are similar. Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) recommends 
checking sample on credibility. It means that taken number of firms should reflect the whole 
situation in population. Criterions of selection were: 
− firms should be mature listed (see assumption of discipline of debt); 
− petroleum exploration and production companies. 
Among 49 firms just 37 are listed, but only 25 of them are listed in London or New York 
stock exchanges that give a possibility to evaluate market value of equity under the same 
conditions. Easterby-Smith et al. (2008: 215) provides two design principles: bias and 
precision. Table 3.1 shows how to generate a sample with respect to them: 
Table 3.1. Principles in designing a sample (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008: 215) 
 Bias 
 High Low 
Precision 
High Precisely wrong Precisely right 
Low Imprecisely wrong Imprecisely right 
 
The researcher explains that low bias make a conclusion of sample reliable for the population, 
and high precision means that claims contain a small number of errors Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2008). Unfortunately, it is hard to have both: low bias and high precision. Therefore, we find 
a compromise and prefer to have low bias to high precision. It is notable that we take a non-
probability purposive sampling. Biases mentioned above determined it. Temporal size is also 
very important for a good sample. It is obviously that research with longer temporary size of 
sample will be more reliable. Our sample is determined by changes in global growth and 
beginning of new business cycle in oil and gas industry (NPC report, 2007). It covers a period 
of 13 years. Here appears one limitation – frequency of data. It is almost impossible to 
monthly data. Also we reject quarterly data, because just 18 % of sample prepares financial 
statements quarterly. Therefore our data have a yearly character and so one disadvantage: 
blurring of results (data with higher frequency give more precise result). It took a huge 
amount of time to sort out data and give them one shape. More detailed we will describe 
problems connected with data collection in the last section of this chapter.   
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Two things could not be getting from annual reports: number of shares and their prices. 
Hence, we followed Thomson Reuter data bases provided by the University of Nordland. 
Thanks to this source of information we get a chance to reflect market value of equity under 
the same conditions for whole sample.  
Chosen sample covers more than 50 % of population. In empirical chapter we will check a 
reliability and sufficiency of collected data, and also provide main computations of variables 
and model estimation. We mentioned about some restrictions of study and conditions of 
sample formation, but now it is time to highlight the quality of research more detailed. 
3.5. Quality of research 
There are a lot of techniques that give possibility to analyze quality of research. With the idea 
to make paper woks more stable to outside scrutiny research literature provide three main 
terms: internal validity, external validity, and reliability. Internal validity is also well known 
as causality, and external validity could be explained as generalizability. These terms 
discussed differently from the side of such philosophical viewpoints as positivism, relativism, 
and constructionism. In following sections we will discuss each of them.  
3.5.1. Internal and external validity 
Mullen et. al. (2009: 289) defines internal validity as an approximate validity that helps to 
infer causal relationship between two variables. Easterby-Smith et al., (2008: 109) suggests 
following questions that will be highlighted due to concept of internal validity: 
− Do the measures correspond closely to reality? 
− Have a sufficient number of perspectives been included? 
− Does the study clearly gain access to the experiences of those in the research setting? 
Practically, it is almost impossible to avoid causal relationships between variables. Internal 
validity could be promoted by the homogeneous sample with respect to factors that are not 
included in models but still have influence on dependent variable. This kind of sample gets 
some critic because it is too narrow in scope and so limit results influence on population 
(Mullen et. al., 2009). It depends from author of the study how to define causal relationships. 
Correlation technique or theories comparing process could be involved. However, in both 
ways we need to analyze information. Our study provides data examination that will be used 
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in the model. During sample formation we imparted date to one shape and one dimension. It 
is allow concluding that our data is suitable for further implementation in econometric model 
and estimation. Very often researchers test causal models. It helps to define very precisely 
which variables should be included in the model and what are actual relationships between 
these variables (Easterby-Smith et. al., 2008). Of coerce, it should be noted that researcher 
have the biggest influence on the idea of determination causality. We should not forget that 
some part of internal validity is inside of data, especially if it is collected and processed by 
professionals. It concerns confidential data bases such as government statistical departments 
or international data bases like Thomson Reuter. Unfortunately, even though the research has 
internal validity it is not obligatory that it will have external validity. 
 “External validity refers to the approximate validity with which we can infer that the 
presumed causal relationship can be generalized to and across alternate measure of the cause 
and effect and across different types of person, settings, and tipes” (Mullen et. al., 2009: 289). 
External validity answers on following question (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008: 109): 
− To what extant does the study confirm or contradict existing findings in the same 
field? 
− What is the probability that patterns observed in the sample will be repeated in the 
general population? 
− Do the concepts and constructs derived from this study have any relevance to other 
settings? 
Opposed to causality external validity could be increased by usage of heterogeneous samples. 
In this case researcher should measure and control influence background that could have 
variables (Mullen et. al., 2009).  Johnson and Duberley (2000: 51) determined four 
differences between internal and external validity that present in the form of threats of 
generalization (another name of external validity): 
− selection: results specific just for population that is studied; 
− setting: results depend on the context with respect to which study is run;  
− history: influence of historical aspects on results; 
− construct effects: studied constructs should be specific for chosen population. 
It is obviously that existence of these threats depends on object of study. The narrower object 
is the more influential power threats have. The current paper covers just one region of oil in 
gas industry so the possibility of threats is high. Study results are more reliable for European 
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region and driven to use in this region. With respect to temporal size of sample almost all 
quantitative   researches are under influence of historical threat. But it is ease to reduce this 
threat by increasing the temporary size of sample. We consider whole business cycle so it is 
obviously that historical threat should be minimal for our investigation. Sample has a strong 
influence on research and it is not just a reliability of results, it is also context and 
construction of whole study. We want to emphasize, with respect to concept of internal and 
external validity current research becomes more specific. We should pay attention to causal 
relationships between variables and try to make result more generalize and useful in other 
regions and areas.  
3.5.2. Reliability 
Reliability is the last item of the quality of research that we want to present. Easterby-Smith 
(2008: 332) defines reliability as “the consistence of measurement in a composite variable 
formed by combining scores on a set of items”. Simpler, reliability explains how stable is 
measurement. It gives answer on following questions (Easterby-Smith (2008: 109): 
− Will the measure yield the same results on the occasions? 
− Will similar observations be reached by other observers? 
− Is the transparence about how sense was made from the raw data? 
The research is reliable when it could be repeated by another researcher or its models could be 
used for analyze at another times. As validity reliability has some threats: subject error and 
bias, observer error and bias (Johnson and Duberley, 2000: 50). Discussing these threats leads 
us to the answer on question: is the current research stable? There is no doubt that our data set 
is reliable. It based on secondary data form official financial statement which were prepared 
by professionals and checked by independent auditors. Listed firms should be more open and 
ready to show own results with the idea to attract new investors. Therefore, threats of data (as 
a subject) bias and error could be neglected. 
Threats connected with observer also could be neglected, because the main error of observer 
is not to be a professional in the studied field. The main task of observer is to collect and 
process data. Other processes with respect to econometrical tools become more automatic and 
make observer’s life easier.   
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3.6. Limitations 
In introduction chapter few restrictions were mentioned. Mostly they connected literature 
review and process of data collection. Now it is time to say about limitations which arise from 
the use of specific econometric tools. Also we are going to discus data limitations more 
detailed. With respect to such econometric software as “R”, “EViews”, “R.A.T.S”, or 
Microsoft Excel there few barriers. First of all is to get access to these tools. Thanks to the 
University of Nordland it is possible to work with “R” and “R.A.T.S”, and of course it is not 
so hard to find Microsoft Excel. All these programs have almost the same set of instruments 
but again observer should be familiar with them. In empirical chapter we will give more 
precise explanation of software exploitation. 
With respect to the quantitative nature of the current research was collected necessary data. 
But this process was full of different barriers. Before the year 2006 it was very hard to 
aggregate date and collects it in the one shape. Almost each firms used currency of the 
residency place. Information about price of shares was given in euro, so it was necessary to 
provide all data in euro. However, from the year 2006 all European firms started using IFRS 
standards. New accountant system changes the form of financial statement and consequently 
the method of filling it. Another problem with connected with currency rates. We could not 
use current currency rates because it could make data unsuitable. We will provide more 
information about data collection and processing in the next chapter. 
3.7. Summary 
Here, we are going to highlight main findings of this chapter. Research plan was developed 
and its main stages determined. Logic of study was provided. We came back to literature 
review and emphasize reader’s attentions on the theoretical base of the investigation. We 
provided references for data collection and processing methodology: Brooks (2008), 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008), Johnson and Duberley (2000), Mullen et. al. (2009), Saunders et 
al. (2009). Current research due to its quantitative nature based on secondary data. Main 
sources for data collection were financial statements and Thomson Reuter’s data bases. Also 
research object was determined more precisely. We defined sample size and explained its 
stability, bias and precision. Internal validity, external validity and reliability were explained 
as the concepts of quality of the research. We describe the study with respect of threats of 
validity and reliability and defined that current research is reliable but its results are specific 
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and could be used just for concrete population.  The main limitation connected with 
econometric software is its availability. Unfortunately, data collection has much more 
restrictions. Almost all of them connected with accountant system and specificity of each 
country from the sample.  
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4. Empirical chapter 
The current chapter provides information about variables computations and their 
implementation into econometrical model. 
4.1. Data section 
Population for this study is all firms in oil and gas industry that perform in European region. 
Sample covers 51 % of population and consists of the following firms: Atlantic, BG Group, 
BP, Cairn, Cepsa, DNO, Edison, Eni, Galp, Gazprom, Hellenic, INA, Lotos, Lokoil, Lundin, 
MOL Group, OMV, PremierOil, Rompetrol, Rosneft, Shell, Statoil, Total, Ukrnafta. As we 
see sample represents whole region so nation specificity of debt ratio determination are 
included. 
4.2. Computation of variables 
Based on works of Gaud et. at. (2007), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Shyam-Sunder and Miller 
(1999) we propose following set of variables: size, tangible assets (TANG), intangible assets 
(INTANG), operating income, cash and cash equivalents, taxes paid.  
We followed by the Gaud et. al. (2007: 206) proposition to estimate factors in following 
ways: 
yV = ln HKxZ 
S = SHLYXIKx	HZZxMZSMHK	HZZxMZ  
y}V = xWHMXLY	XLxSMHK	HZZxMZ  
} = }HZℎ	HLE	HZℎ	xXHKxLMZSMHK	HZZxMZ  
Shyam-Sunder and Miller (1999: 237) suggest how to estimate tax and intangible assets: 
S{ = SHTxZ	HXESMHK	HZZxMZ 
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yS =
yLMHLYXIKx	HZZxMZ
SMHK	HZZxMZ
 
There are a lot of examples how to calculate debt ratio. It could be debt-to-capital ratio or 
debt-to-equity ratio. IFRS recommends using debt-to-equity ratio. In his work Gaud et. al. 
(2007: 205) calculated debt ratio as: 
QVS	OSy =
SMHK	XLHLXHK	ExIM
	HKx		XLHLXHK	ExIM ∗ HWxM	HKx		xXM
 
IFRS gives following computation: 
QVS	OSy =
	HKx		XLHLXHK	ExIM
	HKx		xXM
 
We think that it is more suitable for the research to use market value of debt. We propose next 
formula for debt ration computation: 
QVS	OSy =
SMHK	XLHLXHK	ExIM
HWxM	HKx		xXM
=
SMHK	XLHLXHK	ExIM
JWXx		ZℎHWx ∗ IxW		ZℎHWxZ	MZMHLEXLY	
 
In appendix A provided computations each coefficient with 13 observations. 
Next step is two find average meaning for oil and gas industry. Using methodology proposed 
by Easterby-Smith et. al. (2008) we get results presented in Table 4.1: 
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Table 4.1. Average meanings of estimated variables. Source: Developed by author using tools 
of Microsoft Excel 2007. 
Year Debt ratio Size Tang Income Cash Tax Intang 
2000 0,209 9,231 0,587 0,123 0,056 0,039 0,058 
2001 0,249 9,228 0,577 0,118 0,059 0,042 0,053 
2002 0,218 9,298 0,604 0,117 0,065 0,050 0,057 
2003 0,175 9,386 0,613 0,147 0,137 0,050 0,064 
2004 0,159 9,429 0,619 0,149 0,109 0,061 0,063 
2005 0,156 9,618 0,608 0,164 0,104 0,053 0,076 
2006 0,176 9,716 0,587 0,149 0,072 0,052 0,093 
2007 0,233 9,747 0,583 0,132 0,067 0,052 0,089 
2008 0,248 9,879 0,594 0,123 0,075 0,052 0,103 
2009 0,282 9,782 0,641 0,060 0,060 0,026 0,103 
2010 0,275 9,947 0,585 0,095 0,059 0,034 0,101 
2011 0,283 10,040 0,546 0,104 0,086 0,041 0,096 
2012 0,233 10,063 0,558 0,100 0,089 0,035 0,099 
 
4.3. Variables implementation into econometric model 
With respect to empirical evidence of capital structure we proposed following equation to 
show a relationship between determined factors and debt ratio 
DTCM, = α + βbcd ∗ SIZE, + β9ijk ∗ TANG, − βmni ∗ INCOME, − βibq ∗ CASH, − βm&
∗ 	INTANG, + β9i ∗ TAX, + ^FG 
We estimated present regression model (see Appendix A, Table 1A) and get meanings of 
coefficient presented in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Meanings of beta coefficients. Source: Developed by author using tools of 
Microsoft Excel 2007. 
  Coefficients 
Intercept 1,49645508 
Size -0,078904 
Tang -0,7895915 
Income -1,8360824 
Cash 0,0050238 
Tax 1,67290216 
Intang 1,25768927 
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Due to these results we concluded that manager first of all manipulate with the target debt 
ratio under conditions of amount of tax shield (so called benefit of debt). 
Using calculations equation will have next view: 
DTCM, = 1,496 − 0,079 ∗ SIZE, − 0,790 ∗ TANG, − 1,836 ∗ INCOME, + 0,005 ∗ CASH,
+ 1,258 ∗ 	INTANG, + 1,673 ∗ TAX, + ^FG 
As we see, four of six assumptions were wrong. 
4.4. Summary 
Current chapter presents variables calculation. It shows what data was used, and how were 
computed each variable. Average meaning of variables for whole industry provided. Tax 
benefit of debt is the most desirable factor for managers. 
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5. Analytical chapter 
This chapter presents data interpretation. 
5.1. Results interpretation 
After calculations it is necessary to check each variable on reliability and validity. Moreover, 
it should be built causal modal, because it is obviously that there are relationships between 
determined variables. 
5.2. Summary 
Current chapter provides data interpretation and conclude few assumptions what should be 
done after calculations.  
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6. Conclusion 
6.1. Summary of the study 
This research provides understanding of influence of firm’s size, tangible and intangible 
assets, operational income, cash and cash equivalents, amount of tax paid on the debt ratio. 
We estimated extant to what these factors influence target debt ratio in oil and gas industry. 
Moreover, we found that operational income has the strongest influence on debt ratio. 
We checked all hypotheses using regression model and find negative relationships between 
size of the firm and debt ratio. The same situation is with tangible assets. It is contradict to 
mentioned assumptions. But this correlation is explained by the faster growth of sales and 
tangible asset compare to the debt ratio. Temporal size of sample should have a highest 
frequency as possible. 
Unfortunately, we agreed with Gaud et. al. (2007) that both pecking order and trade-off 
theories do not explain the real dependency of debt ratio on various factors. 
6.2. Main implications and contributions 
With this study we created one more practical evidence with respect to capital structure. We 
hope it will be useful for readers who involved in sphere of corporate finance. During the 
research was made following contributions: 
− there is a negative relationship between amount of sales and debt ratio in oil and gas 
industry; 
− there is a strong negative influence of tangible assets on debt ratio; 
− the strongest negative influence on debt ratio has operational income variable; 
− between debt ratio and cash equivalents there is a positive relationship; 
− tax and intangible assets variables have a strong positive influence on debt ratio. 
According to results we suggest that firms in oil and gas industry choose the target debt ratio 
with respect to the amount of tax shield. Managers are driven by so called benefit of debt. 
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6.3. Research limitations 
Data collection and processing were made in relation to following limitations: 
− availability of data 
− the data character; 
− financial statements provided information in different forms; 
− causal relationships between factors; 
− necessity of checking the concepts of validity and reliability 
The results of the current paper are just available for European region, since data reliable for 
this region was used.   
6.4. Further research opportunities 
We would like to provide some comments to further research. We suggest that good idea for 
further research will be factor analysis. Among project management documents there is one 
called map of risks. It is prepared in relation to the idea of projects and determines all risk that 
has influence on goal of project. We propose to do the same with debt ratio. Analyze so much 
theoretical and empirical evidence about capital structure choice as possible and determine all 
possible factors that have influence on debt ratio choice. Hence, create a map of factors, 
investigate causal relationships between them and then provide a factor analysis. We think 
that such study will give a possibility to manipulate a target debt ratio easier and more 
predictable. It is necessary to support further investigation with reliable data and it is 
recommended to find data in one shape. 
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Table 1A. Estimation of debt ratio variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of 
Microsoft Excel 2007. 
Debt ratio variable 
Year Atlantic BG BP Cairn Cepsa DNO Edison Eni Galp 
2000 0,003 0,001 0,143 0,093 0,597 0,723 0,082 0,264 0,119 
2001 0,012 0,002 0,160 0,228 0,524 0,877 0,090 0,320 0,102 
2002 0,016 0,004 0,235 0,234 0,320 0,719 0,098 0,185 0,115 
2003 0,004 0,003 0,089 0,118 0,106 0,397 0,110 0,350 0,124 
2004 0,450 0,009 0,076 0,453 0,124 0,012 0,093 0,272 0,139 
2005 0,055 0,006 0,047 0,293 0,470 0,011 0,083 0,298 0,144 
2006 0,575 0,005 0,058 0,273 0,121 0,129 0,075 0,187 0,107 
2007 1,632 0,007 0,090 0,067 0,163 0,106 0,063 0,455 0,088 
2008 0,626 0,003 0,090 0,099 0,169 0,138 0,059 0,522 0,225 
2009 1,189 0,011 0,101 0,082 0,515 0,336 0,088 0,591 0,232 
2010 0,347 0,013 0,114 0,187 0,753 0,050 0,082 0,662 0,342 
2011 0,269 0,020 0,102 0,651 0,178 0,001 0,068 0,630 0,422 
2012 0,086 0,018 0,111 0,227 0,270 0,016 0,078 0,455 0,205 
Debt ratio variable 
Year Gazprom Hellenic INA Lotos Lokoil Lundin MOL OMV Premier 
2000 0,061 0,079 0,322   0,125   0,315 0,092 0,409 
2001 0,380 0,069 0,295   0,186 0,332 0,379 0,076 0,344 
2002 0,500 0,086 0,126   0,173 0,434 0,269 0,073 0,227 
2003 0,531 0,033 0,153   0,129 0,005 0,493 0,214 0,031 
2004 0,012 0,058 0,071 0,165 0,102 0,135 0,203 0,014 0,047 
2005 0,313 0,059 0,108 0,044 0,074 0,051 0,307 0,051 0,036 
2006 0,117 0,103 0,173 0,041 0,084 0,093 0,137 0,061 0,056 
2007 0,084 0,096 0,472 0,028 0,090 0,161 0,231 0,182 0,107 
2008 0,043 0,067 0,745 0,018 0,288 0,395 0,702 0,136 0,159 
2009 0,178 0,139 0,873 0,050 0,197 0,037 0,522 0,141 0,325 
2010 0,181 0,179 0,982 0,469 0,210 0,020 0,396 0,288 0,413 
2011 0,172 0,168 0,820 0,549 0,154 0,012 0,406 0,196 0,753 
2012 0,859 0,182 0,278 0,482 0,112 0,011 0,251 0,049 0,100 
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Table 1A. Estimation of debt ratio variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of 
Microsoft Excel 2007. 
Debt ratio variable 
Year Rompetrol Rosneft Shell Staoil Total Tullow Ukrnaft Average 
2000 0,164 0,418 0,026 0,233 0,088 0,158 0,281 0,088 
2001 0,346 0,398 0,026 0,277 0,090 0,178 0,288 0,096 
2002 0,529 0,062 0,023 0,199 0,094 0,198 0,318 0,080 
2003 0,088 0,114 0,021 0,128 0,077 0,264 0,613 0,054 
2004 0,135 0,655 0,025 0,095 0,092 0,072 0,466 0,065 
2005 0,256 0,518 0,028 0,060 0,097 0,164 0,335 0,056 
2006 0,651 0,598 0,031 0,051 0,100 0,102 0,480 0,061 
2007 0,929 0,125 0,036 0,060 0,087 0,397 0,071 0,107 
2008 0,642 0,106 0,069 0,156 0,116 0,362 0,275 0,077 
2009 0,212 0,098 0,192 0,172 0,128 0,406 0,225 0,126 
2010 0,163 0,087 0,200 0,184 0,140 0,092 0,313 0,102 
2011 0,314 0,204 0,145 0,156 0,168 0,175 0,349 0,094 
2012 0,339 0,273 0,116 0,123 0,169 0,639 0,389 0,059 
 
Table 2A. Estimation of the firm’s size variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of 
Microsoft Excel 2007. 
Size variable 
Year Atlantic BG BP Cairn Cepsa DNO Edison Eni Galp 
2000 4,479 9,075 11,296 8,065 9,962 7,951 9,686 10,681 9,879 
2001 4,799 9,120 11,313 8,031 9,987 8,187 9,699 10,690 9,903 
2002 4,913 9,192 11,324 8,041 9,973 8,350 9,726 10,681 9,915 
2003 5,257 9,254 11,306 8,193 10,044 8,426 9,734 10,712 9,942 
2004 5,027 9,333 11,379 7,980 10,077 8,240 9,756 10,766 9,979 
2005 5,536 9,487 11,459 8,312 10,209 8,022 9,823 10,868 10,041 
2006 5,730 9,591 11,504 8,350 10,267 8,249 9,931 10,935 10,081 
2007 5,403 9,609 11,533 8,352 10,276 8,244 9,918 10,941 10,095 
2008 6,764 9,755 11,637 8,369 10,359 8,262 10,044 11,034 10,172 
2009 7,469 9,680 11,463 8,123 10,206 8,062 9,948 10,920 10,069 
2010 7,754 9,932 11,562 9,097 10,295 8,221 10,019 10,994 10,138 
2011 7,766 10,027 11,659 8,775 10,078 8,439 10,056 11,032 10,214 
2012 7,884 10,059 11,661 8,181 10,126 8,577 10,080 11,105 10,256 
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Table 2A. Estimation of the firm’s size variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of 
Microsoft Excel 2007. 
Size 
Year Gazprom Hellenic INA Lotos Lokoil Lundin MOL OMV Premier 
2000 9,355 9,539 9,334   10,014   9,597 9,902 8,134 
2001 9,446 9,590 9,330   10,021 7,048 9,606 9,889 8,401 
2002 9,572 9,566 9,271   10,078 7,645 9,600 9,850 8,491 
2003 9,720 9,656 9,309   10,238 8,223 9,713 9,883 8,218 
2004 9,842 9,746 9,378 9,252 10,422 8,566 9,827 9,995 7,854 
2005 10,057 9,823 9,446 9,364 10,639 8,796 9,926 10,193 8,448 
2006 10,198 9,910 9,492 9,487 10,723 8,819 9,997 10,278 8,448 
2007 10,231 9,931 9,505 9,498 10,806 8,913 9,950 10,302 8,655 
2008 10,412 10,006 9,556 9,592 10,925 8,980 10,084 10,407 8,709 
2009 10,276 9,830 9,472 9,536 10,802 8,650 10,048 10,253 8,686 
2010 10,408 9,928 9,535 9,674 10,914 8,795 10,169 10,368 8,776 
2011 10,538 9,969 9,600 9,846 11,019 9,104 10,264 10,532 8,810 
2012 10,575 10,020 9,598 9,900 11,036 9,129 10,278 10,630 9,042 
Size 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Year Rompetrol Rosneft Shell Staoil Total Tullow Ukrnaft Average 
2000 8,731 8,780 11,199 10,485 11,059 6,821 8,284 3,525 
2001 8,746 8,864 11,211 10,488 11,023 7,814 8,255 3,405 
2002 8,790 8,988 11,327 10,507 11,011 7,981 8,365 3,421 
2003 8,863 9,127 11,399 10,519 11,020 8,051 8,453 3,453 
2004 8,964 9,330 11,453 10,606 11,068 8,282 8,615 3,301 
2005 9,159 10,101 11,487 10,708 11,139 8,578 8,837 3,350 
2006 9,475 10,264 11,504 10,750 11,187 8,692 9,031 3,385 
2007 9,602 10,368 11,551 10,841 11,201 8,735 9,226 3,375 
2008 9,722 10,450 11,661 10,937 11,255 8,769 9,114 3,456 
2009 9,564 10,288 11,444 10,788 11,118 8,695 9,157 3,438 
2010 9,598 10,434 11,566 10,845 11,202 9,037 9,426 3,520 
2011 9,731 10,828 11,672 10,933 11,266 9,363 9,477 3,522 
2012 9,745 10,882 11,669 10,972 11,301 9,370 9,505 3,517 
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Table 3A. Estimation of tangible asset variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of 
Microsoft Excel 2007. 
Tang 
Year Atlantic BG BP Cairn Cepsa DNO Edison Eni Galp 
2000 0,055 0,567 0,507 0,900 0,553 0,858 0,495 0,595 0,580 
2001 0,053 0,577 0,545 0,785 0,556 0,661 0,495 0,576 0,614 
2002 0,054 0,605 0,551 0,930 0,627 0,764 0,500 0,561 0,627 
2003 0,054 0,561 0,581 0,925 0,669 0,774 0,505 0,589 0,679 
2004 0,480 0,532 0,559 0,886 0,645 0,304 0,541 0,592 0,631 
2005 0,648 0,496 0,511 0,617 0,607 0,197 0,563 0,579 0,633 
2006 0,437 0,489 0,505 0,594 0,622 0,473 0,539 0,556 0,571 
2007 0,791 0,507 0,528 0,293 0,607 0,426 0,534 0,517 0,609 
2008 0,680 0,474 0,526 0,496 0,643 0,617 0,511 0,531 0,579 
2009 0,787 0,530 0,555 0,695 0,634 0,583 0,471 0,555 0,515 
2010 0,618 0,575 0,501 0,000 0,617 0,449 0,444 0,561 0,563 
2011 0,568 0,620 0,494 0,000 0,577 0,467 0,339 0,568 0,594 
2012 0,452 0,685 0,494 0,020 0,562 0,560 0,348 0,515 0,465 
Tang 
Year Gazprom Hellenic INA Lotos Lokoil Lundin MOL OMV Premier 
2000 0,136 0,512 0,567   0,621   0,686 0,544 0,669 
2001 0,110 0,500 0,576   0,658 0,415 0,613 0,573 0,652 
2002 0,109 0,554 0,531   0,662 0,763 0,618 0,585 0,694 
2003 0,099 0,565 0,533   0,689 0,719 0,660 0,726 0,605 
2004 0,096 0,619 0,537 0,739 0,709 0,758 0,671 0,811 0,642 
2005 0,111 0,614 0,761 0,679 0,696 0,751 0,679 0,546 0,700 
2006 0,116 0,593 0,728 0,669 0,721 0,821 0,558 0,548 0,552 
2007 0,115 0,583 0,723 0,704 0,713 0,838 0,616 0,535 0,503 
2008 0,113 0,478 0,748 0,753 0,753 0,844 0,562 0,589 0,539 
2009 0,535 0,605 0,773 0,832 0,730 0,876 0,692 0,640 0,560 
2010 0,554 0,622 0,791 0,840 0,724 0,837 0,690 0,593 0,579 
2011 0,590 0,604 0,778 0,515 0,706 0,884 0,675 0,603 0,588 
2012 0,583 0,644 0,783 0,780 0,758 0,890 0,654 0,575 0,563 
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Table 3A. Estimation of tangible asset variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of 
Microsoft Excel 2007. 
Tang 
Year Rompetrol Rosneft Shell Staoil Total Tullow Ukrnaft Average 
2000 0,872 0,711 0,498 0,666 0,523 0,615 0,774 0,222 
2001 0,820 0,762 0,478 0,660 0,541 0,757 0,863 0,203 
2002 0,798 0,667 0,461 0,622 0,529 0,761 0,921 0,217 
2003 0,914 0,733 0,456 0,594 0,531 0,639 0,906 0,222 
2004 0,789 0,740 0,472 0,644 0,509 0,693 0,887 0,207 
2005 0,804 0,809 0,409 0,654 0,502 0,699 0,924 0,194 
2006 0,685 0,788 0,528 0,702 0,497 0,477 0,901 0,191 
2007 0,581 0,717 0,494 0,838 0,487 0,410 0,914 0,192 
2008 0,587 0,731 0,465 0,796 0,471 0,428 0,933 0,202 
2009 0,610 0,716 0,544 0,710 0,512 0,450 0,908 0,213 
2010 0,654 0,675 0,533 0,578 0,491 0,375 0,769 0,173 
2011 0,633 0,071 0,524 0,566 0,503 0,365 0,822 0,169 
2012 0,638 0,051 0,564 0,592 0,505 0,487 0,769 0,164 
 
Table 4A. Estimation of operating income variable. Source: Developed by author using tools 
of Microsoft Excel 2007. 
Income 
Year Atlantic BG BP Cairn Cepsa DNO Edison Eni Galp 
2000 -0,014 0,157 0,160 0,201 0,126 0,076 0,023 0,179 0,135 
2001 -0,044 0,170 0,180 0,133 0,162 0,156 0,024 0,166 0,144 
2002 -0,051 0,187 0,138 0,104 0,127 0,256 0,025 0,129 0,143 
2003 -0,019 0,210 0,109 0,170 0,208 0,303 0,025 0,141 0,154 
2004 -0,021 0,212 0,132 -0,031 0,182 0,681 0,039 0,180 0,144 
2005 -0,005 0,229 0,158 0,094 0,160 0,052 0,041 0,201 0,145 
2006 -0,032 0,268 0,162 -0,095 0,193 0,086 0,048 0,219 0,181 
2007 -0,122 0,227 0,137 -0,044 0,119 0,098 0,061 0,186 0,165 
2008 0,026 0,197 0,154 0,019 0,053 0,002 0,057 0,160 0,025 
2009 0,084 0,148 0,112 -0,090 0,056 0,048 0,042 0,103 0,061 
2010 0,219 0,136 -0,014 -0,078 0,085 0,117 0,017 0,122 0,070 
2011 0,160 0,140 0,136 -0,165 0,053 0,180 0,000 0,118 0,063 
2012 0,179 0,138 0,066 -0,068 0,043 0,222 0,015 0,108 0,039 
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Table 4A. Estimation of operating income variable. Source: Developed by author using tools 
of Microsoft Excel 2007. 
Income 
Year Gazprom Hellenic INA Lotos Lokoil Lundin MOL OMV Premier 
2000 0,286 0,047 0,118   0,237   0,003 0,119 0,023 
2001 0,246 0,052 0,113   0,148 0,003 -0,003 0,106 0,070 
2002 0,185 0,074 0,107   0,121 0,003 0,060 0,080 0,126 
2003 0,226 0,087 0,107   0,175 0,395 0,054 0,102 0,159 
2004 0,257 0,064 0,112 0,152 0,203 0,144 0,153 0,095 0,085 
2005 0,286 0,126 0,110 0,153 0,233 0,259 0,150 0,127 0,149 
2006 0,310 0,081 0,112 0,103 0,217 0,104 0,182 0,116 0,184 
2007 0,295 0,094 0,102 0,073 0,225 0,083 0,146 0,103 0,097 
2008 0,309 0,022 0,107 -0,012 0,192 0,058 0,068 0,109 0,191 
2009 0,116 0,045 0,080 0,028 0,124 -0,171 0,056 0,066 0,031 
2010 0,145 0,050 0,089 0,060 0,137 0,162 0,053 0,088 0,033 
2011 0,190 0,024 0,100 0,053 0,144 0,262 0,051 0,088 0,036 
2012 0,153 0,016 0,108 0,015 0,142 0,165 0,046 0,102 0,074 
Income 
 Year Rompetrol Rosneft Shell Staoil Total Tullow Ukrnaft Average 
 2000 0,210 0,136 0,089 0,307 0,167 0,007 0,045 0,087 
 2001 0,184 0,139 0,094 0,281 0,144 0,103 0,054 0,087 
 2002 0,186 0,134 0,121 0,210 0,119 0,142 0,072 0,085 
 2003 0,073 0,106 0,128 0,221 0,160 0,152 0,077 0,092 
 2004 0,038 0,048 0,151 0,262 0,196 0,072 0,175 0,098 
 2005 0,094 0,184 0,147 0,329 0,228 0,187 0,253 0,100 
 2006 0,057 0,120 0,190 0,371 0,229 0,132 0,180 0,092 
 2007 0,039 0,143 0,188 0,388 0,211 0,090 0,195 0,083 
 2008 -0,029 0,168 0,180 0,459 0,238 0,125 0,208 0,082 
 2009 -0,024 0,110 0,072 0,216 0,111 0,030 0,036 0,045 
 2010 0,036 0,144 0,110 0,213 0,138 0,031 0,198 0,062 
 2011 0,065 0,014 0,161 0,276 0,149 0,106 0,200 0,066 
 2012 0,066 0,008 0,140 0,263 0,145 0,126 0,200 0,068 
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Table 5A. Estimation of cash variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of Microsoft 
Excel 2007. 
Cash 
Year Atlantic BG BP Cairn Cepsa DNO Edison Eni Galp 
2000 0,143 0,013 0,008 0,026 0,014 0,077 0,015 0,014 0,018 
2001 0,108 0,014 0,010 0,026 0,013 0,070 0,022 0,022 0,020 
2002 0,237 0,021 0,010 0,031 0,011 0,041 0,030 0,050 0,020 
2003 1,961 0,016 0,012 0,041 0,018 0,055 0,031 0,024 0,028 
2004 0,837 0,015 0,007 0,136 0,016 0,557 0,029 0,018 0,027 
2005 1,122 0,131 0,014 0,100 0,044 0,363 0,023 0,016 0,027 
2006 0,479 0,115 0,012 0,126 0,037 0,127 0,019 0,045 0,041 
2007 0,012 0,122 0,015 0,498 0,022 0,137 0,007 0,021 0,019 
2008 0,006 0,041 0,036 0,488 0,050 0,018 0,012 0,017 0,019 
2009 0,029 0,043 0,035 0,439 0,058 0,068 0,045 0,014 0,032 
2010 0,111 0,050 0,068 0,049 0,073 0,255 0,029 0,012 0,021 
2011 0,144 0,059 0,048 0,686 0,105 0,325 0,018 0,010 0,029 
2012 0,309 0,068 0,065 0,436 0,111 0,204 0,051 0,056 0,136 
Cash 
Year Gazprom Hellenic INA Lotos Lokoil Lundin MOL OMV Premier 
2000 0,011 0,074 0,057   0,066   0,061 0,034 0,091 
2001 0,009 0,090 0,055   0,059 0,327 0,057 0,033 0,118 
2002 0,082 0,035 0,058   0,057 0,090 0,044 0,032 0,253 
2003 0,013 0,102 0,022   0,055 0,112 0,041 0,047 0,179 
2004 0,111 0,055 0,042 0,039 0,042 0,046 0,054 0,151 0,210 
2005 0,029 0,046 0,019 0,110 0,041 0,050 0,032 0,126 0,046 
2006 0,095 0,039 0,028 0,099 0,016 0,005 0,184 0,088 0,044 
2007 0,043 0,041 0,029 0,095 0,014 0,024 0,053 0,033 0,219 
2008 0,103 0,170 0,022 0,058 0,031 0,018 0,076 0,033 0,223 
2009 0,029 0,085 0,012 0,024 0,029 0,026 0,042 0,031 0,099 
2010 0,036 0,087 0,010 0,022 0,028 0,020 0,070 0,036 0,099 
2011 0,025 0,133 0,011 0,019 0,030 0,027 0,062 0,013 0,079 
2012 0,058 0,122 0,017 0,013 0,029 0,030 0,067 0,040 0,039 
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Table 5A. Estimation of cash variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of Microsoft 
Excel 2007. 
Cash 
Year Rompetrol Rosneft Shell Staoil Total Tullow Ukrnaft Average 
2000 0,063 0,031 0,011 0,022 0,054 0,373 0,007 0,056 
2001 0,063 0,037 0,008 0,032 0,040 0,181 0,005 0,059 
2002 0,064 0,054 0,014 0,058 0,058 0,212 0,005 0,065 
2003 0,040 0,035 0,024 0,075 0,060 0,295 0,006 0,137 
2004 0,030 0,041 0,033 0,067 0,044 0,107 0,017 0,109 
2005 0,027 0,039 0,030 0,048 0,041 0,062 0,017 0,104 
2006 0,032 0,011 0,038 0,027 0,024 0,050 0,025 0,072 
2007 0,034 0,013 0,036 0,052 0,053 0,039 0,042 0,067 
2008 0,070 0,018 0,054 0,043 0,104 0,130 0,041 0,075 
2009 0,102 0,024 0,033 0,044 0,091 0,049 0,016 0,060 
2010 0,078 0,044 0,042 0,047 0,101 0,040 0,043 0,059 
2011 0,070 0,005 0,033 0,072 0,085 0,029 0,029 0,086 
2012 0,080 0,006 0,051 0,083 0,090 0,035 0,031 0,089 
 
Table 6A. Estimation of tax variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of Microsoft 
Excel 2007. 
Tax 
Year Atlantic BG BP Cairn Cepsa DNO Edison Eni Galp 
2000 0,081 0,028 0,011 0,007 0,022 0,028 0,001 0,072 0,033 
2001 0,126 0,033 0,012 0,009 0,024 0,074 0,041 0,056 0,034 
2002 0,161 0,040 0,008 0,010 0,016 0,178 0,053 0,048 0,036 
2003 0,028 0,057 0,029 0,013 0,052 0,228 0,026 0,048 0,024 
2004 0,003 0,061 0,036 0,004 0,051 0,465 0,006 0,080 0,032 
2005 0,008 0,072 0,046 0,029 0,059 -0,005 0,001 0,097 0,032 
2006 0,004 0,092 0,057 0,013 0,044 0,031 0,001 0,120 0,034 
2007 0,006 0,075 0,044 0,020 0,043 0,041 0,012 0,091 0,044 
2008 0,087 0,070 0,055 0,033 0,025 0,042 0,025 0,083 0,005 
2009 0,009 0,040 0,035 -0,046 0,026 0,068 0,017 0,057 0,013 
2010 0,080 0,036 -0,006 0,000 0,033 0,014 0,005 0,069 0,018 
2011 0,077 0,045 0,043 0,000 0,023 0,015 0,006 0,069 0,015 
2012 0,081 0,044 0,023 -0,073 0,020 0,039 0,003 0,083 0,012 
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Table 6A. Estimation of tax variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of Microsoft 
Excel 2007. 
Tax 
Year Gazprom Hellenic INA Lotos Lokoil Lundin MOL OMV Premier 
2000 0,029 0,012 0,003   0,046   0,005 0,039 0,026 
2001 0,023 0,018 0,006   0,043 0,001 0,006 0,033 0,032 
2002 0,022 0,026 0,011   0,038 0,010 0,002 0,025 0,047 
2003 0,023 0,028 0,005   0,036 0,030 0,021 0,032 0,066 
2004 0,085 0,030 0,020 0,036 0,054 0,041 0,029 0,032 0,046 
2005 0,089 0,037 0,012 0,024 0,057 0,112 0,014 0,032 0,109 
2006 0,079 0,020 0,012 0,023 0,060 0,059 0,011 0,028 0,105 
2007 0,081 0,025 0,015 0,020 0,057 0,042 0,034 0,027 0,083 
2008 0,071 -0,002 0,007 -0,009 0,058 0,025 0,006 0,036 0,133 
2009 0,027 0,011 0,003 0,013 0,024 0,015 0,019 0,022 0,019 
2010 0,028 0,016 0,012 0,002 0,025 0,104 0,014 0,028 0,020 
2011 0,032 0,006 0,019 -0,005 0,029 0,214 0,007 0,022 0,038 
2012 0,023 0,004 0,013 -0,028 0,028 0,127 0,010 0,035 0,043 
Tax 
 
Year Rompetrol Rosneft Shell Staoil Total Tullow Ukrnaft Average 
2000 0,010 0,057 0,040 0,207 0,074 0,046 0,026 0,012 
2001 0,010 0,049 0,065 0,193 0,071 0,031 0,026 0,017 
2002 0,009 0,033 0,095 0,167 0,074 0,046 0,035 0,023 
2003 0,007 0,030 0,098 0,124 0,079 0,070 0,037 0,021 
2004 0,012 0,011 0,068 0,183 0,073 0,020 0,046 0,030 
2005 0,004 0,054 0,059 0,208 0,060 0,062 0,067 0,014 
2006 0,002 0,012 0,078 0,255 0,060 0,053 0,046 0,016 
2007 0,006 0,066 0,069 0,289 0,056 0,029 0,029 0,015 
2008 0,005 0,025 0,086 0,316 0,053 0,031 0,031 0,017 
2009 0,003 0,024 0,028 0,173 0,049 0,001 0,009 0,009 
2010 0,004 0,028 0,046 0,154 0,044 0,011 0,056 0,010 
2011 0,001 0,003 0,071 0,176 0,039 0,036 0,047 0,012 
2012 0,001 0,002 0,065 0,175 0,037 0,048 0,061 0,009 
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Table 7A. Estimation of intangible variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of 
Microsoft Excel 2007. 
Intang 
Year Atlantic BG BP Cairn Cepsa DNO Edison Eni Galp 
2000 0,064 0,113 0,137 0,012 0,024 0,093 0,224 0,043 0,056 
2001 0,076 0,124 0,116 0,010 0,024 0,064 0,216 0,045 0,057 
2002 0,075 0,120 0,098 0,009 0,025 0,070 0,237 0,048 0,055 
2003 0,121 0,117 0,087 0,009 0,025 0,066 0,244 0,054 0,060 
2004 0,069 0,141 0,077 0,007 0,022 0,085 0,233 0,046 0,063 
2005 0,199 0,088 0,073 0,429 0,026 0,056 0,223 0,038 0,065 
2006 0,066 0,081 0,074 0,625 0,025 0,098 0,228 0,042 0,065 
2007 0,180 0,078 0,075 0,361 0,020 0,017 0,241 0,074 0,058 
2008 0,237 0,165 0,088 0,252 0,033 0,116 0,236 0,095 0,088 
2009 0,100 0,199 0,085 0,168 0,030 0,194 0,222 0,098 0,201 
2010 0,163 0,159 0,084 0,085 0,029 0,172 0,221 0,085 0,169 
2011 0,181 0,113 0,113 0,000 0,041 0,137 0,210 0,077 0,151 
2012 0,175 0,069 0,120 0,381 0,045 0,134 0,224 0,032 0,122 
Intang 
Year Gazprom Hellenic INA Lotos Lokoil Lundin MOL OMV Premier 
2000 0,011 0,020 0,011   0,016   0,018 0,023 0,045 
2001 0,009 0,021 0,013   0,024 0,093 0,019 0,023 0,043 
2002 0,007 0,055 0,024   0,018 0,097 0,027 0,022 0,042 
2003 0,008 0,037 0,058   0,020 0,143 0,019 0,025 0,059 
2004 0,007 0,025 0,083 0,014 0,020 0,093 0,003 0,022 0,122 
2005 0,007 0,023 0,027 0,015 0,017 0,090 0,020 0,009 0,080 
2006 0,006 0,027 0,031 0,016 0,016 0,046 0,043 0,011 0,122 
2007 0,005 0,026 0,033 0,013 0,016 0,038 0,070 0,025 0,101 
2008 0,005 0,025 0,033 0,008 0,016 0,037 0,066 0,038 0,109 
2009 0,044 0,032 0,034 0,009 0,021 0,228 0,085 0,038 0,091 
2010 0,040 0,024 0,034 0,008 0,017 0,238 0,071 0,117 0,103 
2011 0,035 0,025 0,034 0,026 0,015 0,194 0,068 0,121 0,081 
2012 0,031 0,021 0,030 0,029 0,020 0,147 0,073 0,114 0,136 
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Table 7A. Estimation of intangible variable. Source: Developed by author using tools of 
Microsoft Excel 2007. 
Intang 
Year Rompetrol Rosneft Shell Staoil Total Tullow Ukrnaft Average 
2000 -0,234 0,002 0,009 0,282 0,034 0,331 0,005 0,052 
2001 -0,205 0,003 0,008 0,290 0,036 0,150 0,009 0,043 
2002 -0,193 0,003 0,011 0,308 0,032 0,163 0,014 0,045 
2003 -0,184 0,003 0,012 0,299 0,025 0,215 0,014 0,049 
2004 0,010 0,001 0,015 0,239 0,037 0,131 0,007 0,047 
2005 0,010 0,001 0,014 0,198 0,041 0,151 0,006 0,065 
2006 0,019 0,003 0,020 0,207 0,045 0,413 0,004 0,081 
2007 0,023 0,054 0,020 0,196 0,041 0,457 0,005 0,076 
2008 0,040 0,067 0,018 0,161 0,045 0,593 0,006 0,090 
2009 0,046 0,064 0,018 0,096 0,059 0,414 0,006 0,080 
2010 0,040 0,056 0,016 0,062 0,062 0,476 0,005 0,075 
2011 0,041 0,004 0,013 0,121 0,076 0,513 0,005 0,072 
2012 0,041 0,003 0,012 0,112 0,075 0,317 0,006 0,075 
 
Table 1A. Regression model results. Source: Developed by author using tools of Microsoft 
Excel 2007. 
Regression statistic   
Multiple R 0,94677134 
R-square 0,89637597 
Adjusted R-square 0,79275194 
Standard error 0,02059466 
Observations 13 
 
  df SS MS F Significancy F 
Regression 6 0,02201 0,00367 8,65027 0,00947 
Residual 6 0,00254 0,00042     
Total 12 0,02456       
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Table 1A. Regression model results. Source: Developed by author using tools of Microsoft 
Excel 2007. 
  Coefficients Standard error t-stat P-value 
Intercept 1,496 1,295 1,156 0,292 
Size -0,079 0,123 -0,641 0,545 
Tang -0,790 0,486 -1,623 0,156 
Income -1,836 0,597 -3,076 0,022 
Cash 0,005 0,458 0,011 0,992 
Tax 1,673 1,437 1,164 0,288 
Intang 1,258 1,697 0,741 0,487 
 
